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There is a curious anomaly in the law of punitive damages. Jurors as-
sess punitive damages in the amount that they believe will best "punish"
the defendant. But, in fact, defendants are not always punished to the
degree that the jury intends. Under the Internal Revenue Code, punitive
damages paid by business defendants are tax deductible and, as a result,
these defendants often pay (in real dollars) far less than the jury be-
lieves they deserve to pay.
To solve this problem of under-punishment, many scholars and poli-
cymakers, including President Obama, have proposed making punitive
damages nondeductible in all cases. In our view, however, such a blan-
ket nondeductibility rule would, notwithstanding its theoretical ele-
gance, be ineffective in solving the under-punishment problem. In par-
ticular, defendants could easily circumvent the nondeductibility rule by
disguising punitive damages as compensatory damages in pre-trial set-
tlements.
Instead, the under-punishment problem is best addressed at the state
level by making juries "tax-aware." Tax-aware juries would adjust the
amount of punitive damages to impose the desired after-tax cost on the
defendant. As we explain, the effect of tax awareness cannot be circum-
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vented by defendants through pre-trial settlements. For this and a num-
ber of other reasons, tax awareness would best solve the under-
punishment problem even though it does come at the cost of enlarging
plaintiff windfalls. However, given the defendant-focused features of
current punitive damages doctrine, this cost is not particularly trou-
bling.
INTRODUCTION
A S the name implies, punitive damages are principally awardedto punish defendants for torts committed with a malicious or
reckless state of mind.' In crafting an appropriate financial pun-
ishment for such misconduct, jurors are typically instructed to con-
sider, among a number of other factors, the defendant's financial
condition.2 However, jurors are not currently informed of the fact
that business-related punitive damages are, like other business-
related expenses, deductible for federal income tax purposes.
When punitive damages are deductible, the true cost of a punitive
damages award is often substantially less than the nominal amount
of the award. As a result, business defendants in punitive damages
cases are typically under-punished relative to the jury's intentions.3
'Our claims in this paper are limited to the American legal context. On the pun-
ishment rationale of punitive damages, see Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct.
2605, 2621 (2008) ("Regardless of the alternative rationales over the years, the con-
sensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retri-
bution and deterring harmful conduct."); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,
352 (2007) (reaffirming the Court's long-held view that it is "clear that '[plunitive
damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition"') (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (describing punitive damages as "private
fines" designed to punish and deter "reprehensible conduct").
'See generally TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28
(1993) (describing as "well-settled law" the notion that evidence related to the finan-
cial condition of a defendant is admissible in the context of determining punitive
damages awards). For specific citations to each state's practices regarding the admis-
sion of evidence related to the wealth or financial position of the defendant, see 1
Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 5.3(F), at 297-307 (5th ed. 2005); Michael L.
Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages' Iron Cage, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1297, 1316
n.108 (2005).
'A small number of studies and academic articles have noted the "under-
punishment problem" and, in some cases, have addressed either or both of the plain-
tiff- or defendant-related tax issues associated with punitive damages. However, for
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This Article considers this problem and its potential solutions.!
The under-punishment problem stems from the fact that the
typical jury's understanding of federal tax law is inconsistent with
how the tax law actually operates. This inconsistency could be re-
solved in two independent ways. One option would be to change
federal tax law to match juror expectations by making punitive
damages nondeductible in all cases. A number of scholars and poli-
cymakers, including President Barack Obama in February 2010 as
reasons enumerated later in the Article, their analyses fall short in various respects.
First, they all overlook a critical threshold issue regarding the possibility of tax
awareness and gross ups. Second, they fail to adequately address the benefits and
costs of alternative tax regimes or some of the transition costs associated with them.
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damage Payments:
Who Should Ultimately Bear the Burden for Corporate Misconduct?, 47 Ala. L. Rev.
825, 881 (1996) (arguing that punitive damages ought to be made nondeductible);
Brock D. Phillips, The Tax Consequences of a Punitive Damage Award, 31 Hastings
L.J. 909, 928 (1980) (arguing that punitive damages ought to remain deductible);
Robert W. Wood, Further Thoughts on Tax Treatment of Punitive Damages, 93 Tax
Notes 1502 (Dec. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Wood, Further Thoughts] (same); K. Todd
Curry, Comment, The Deductibility of Punitive Damages as an Ordinary and Neces-
sary Business Expense: Reviving the Public Policy Doctrine, 26 San Diego L. Rev.
357, 369 (1989); Catherine M. Del Castillo, Note, Should Punitive Damages Be Non-
deductible? The Expansion of the Public-Policy Doctrine, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 819, 833-34
(1990); Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff's Windfall from Punitive Damage
Litigation, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1900, 1917 (1992) [hereinafter Note, An Economic
Analysis]; see also Schlueter, supra note 2, at § 18 (briefly discussing certain tax is-
sues); New York State Bar Association Tax Section, The Deductibility of Punitive
Damages, 93 Tax Notes 1209, 1213-15 (Nov. 26, 2001) [hereinafter NYSBA Report];
Paul Feinberg, Federal Income Taxation of Punitive Damages Awarded in Personal
Injury Actions, 42 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 339, 340-41 (1992) (arguing that plaintiffs
should not be able to exclude punitive damages from income).
4 The under-punishment problem is implicated only in cases where the defendant's
liability for punitive damages arises in connection with the defendant's trade or busi-
ness. Only in these cases are punitive damages deductible. See I.R.C. § 262 (disallow-
ing deductions for expenses that are not attributable to business or investment activ-
ity); cf. Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57, 58 (characterizing punitive damages incurred
in connection with a trade or business as deductible business expenses under I.R.C.
§ 162). When punitive damages are nondeductible, there is no under-punishment
problem because the defendant bears the full burden of the nominal penalty. Thus,
unless otherwise explicitly stated, all of the examples in this Article assume that the
plaintiffs claim arose out of the defendant's business. In addition, it should be noted
that, depending on the specific manner in which punitive damages are calculated, un-
der-punishment might not result. For example, if punitive damages are based exclu-
sively on the pre-tax profit from the defendant's tortious activity, then current prac-
tices might not result in under-punishment. However, if punitive damages are based
on the defendant's wealth or the after-tax profit from the defendant's tortious activity,
then current practices would result in under-punishment.
[Vol. 96:12951298
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part of his fiscal year 2011 budget, have proposed this solution.! In-
voking the same rationale as these academic arguments, the
Obama administration has argued that the under-punishment ef-
fect of current tax law "undermines the role of such damages in
discouraging and penalizing certain undesirable actions or activi-
ties."'
Unfortunately, the full implications of such a policy shift have
yet to be explored.' Indeed, while we agree with President Obama
that the under-punishment effect is problematic, we disagree with
his proposed solution. Instead, we think an alternative approach,
which has been largely ignored until now, ought to be adopted.
This alternative approach would focus on changing juror expecta-
tions to match current federal tax law, in particular by educating
jurors about the effect of the deductibility of punitive damages
paid by business defendants. These "tax-aware" jurors would take
this effect into account when crafting the punitive damages award
by adjusting or grossing up the punitive damages to offset deducti-
bility, thus ensuring that the intended financial sanction is in fact
borne by the defendant.
Our principal goal in this Article is to explain which of the two
approaches to solving the under-punishment problem-blanket
nondeductibility or juror tax awareness-is better, given the stated
purposes of punitive damages law in most states.! As we demon-
'See, e.g., NYSBA Report, supra note 3, at 1209, 1210 (detailing Clinton admini-
stration proposals in 1999 and 2000); 149 Cong. Rec. 13065-66 (May 22, 2003) (noting
that the Conference Committee rejected a Senate amendment to the tax code that
would deny deductions for punitive damages paid); Dep't of Treasury, General Ex-
planations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2011 Revenue Proposals 95 (2010),
available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/greenbkl0.pdf [hereinafter
General Explanations]; see also sources cited supra note 3.
'General Explanations, supra note 5, at 95.
See supra note 3 (noting the failures of extant scholarship and analysis to explore
the issue in sufficient detail).
'Two caveats are in order. First, in what follows, we assume that most state tort law
policies embrace the point that punitive damages are designed at least in part to pun-
ish. As we observe, infra note 9, a small number of states view punitive damages as
additional measures of compensation (and thus would be justified in not admitting
evidence of defendants' wealth); in those cases, our analysis will not apply. Second,
while the text discusses two mutually exclusive solutions to the under-punishment
problem, they are not mutually exclusive options. Thus, punitive damages could be
made nondeductible and jurors could simultaneously be made tax aware. But as we
2010] 1299
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strate, the choice between these two approaches depends largely
on how easily defendants could circumvent a rule of nondeductibil-
ity through settlements that disguise punitive damages as compen-
satory damages, which would remain deductible under either ap-
proach. It is likely that this type of circumvention would be easy in
the vast majority of punitive damages cases. To the extent that a
rule of nondeductibility is circumvented, the defendant would be
able to participate in the tax gains from circumvention in the form
of lower after-tax settlement costs; this would result in precisely the
same under-punishment effect that nondeductibility is intended to
correct. Accordingly, if circumvention is in fact relatively easy, the
tax-awareness approach (which, as we explain, is not subject to cir-
cumvention) is the preferred solution to the under-punishment
problem.
Federalism and regulatory diversity concerns also support choos-
ing the tax-awareness approach. Tax awareness is a state tort law
solution to under-punishment, while nondeductibility would re-
quire a change to federal tax law. The goal of correcting the under-
punishment problem is to advance the state's interest in adequately
punishing blameworthy conduct that is committed within its bor-
ders. States are therefore more capable of determining whether the
benefit of correcting under-punishment is worth its associated
costs, such as the administrative burdens of implementation. Addi-
tionally, by avoiding a blanket federal solution, the tax-awareness
approach preserves greater regulatory diversity at the state level.
Thus, states whose extracompensatory damages regimes are not
designed to punish could easily opt out of tax awareness.' The fed-
eral solution of blanket nondeductibility is not nearly as flexible.
discuss, since jurors implicitly assume nondeductibility, making jurors tax aware
would have no effect if punitive damages were nondeductible.
'Michigan, New Hampshire, and Connecticut have in the past ascribed a "private"
and compensatory function to punitive damages awards in their states. See, e.g., Dor-
oszka v. Lavine, 150 A. 692, 692-93 (Conn. 1930); Wise v. Daniel, 190 N.W. 746, 747-
48 (Mich. 1922); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1872). Additionally, approximately
four states (Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington) only allow puni-
tive damages where expressly authorized by statute. See Schlueter, supra note 2, § 2.2,
at 29 (2005) (providing sources). By contrast, the vast majority uses punitive damages
as a jury-determined measure to achieve state interests in retribution and deterrence.




Unfortunately, while a rule of tax awareness would best solve
the under-punishment problem, it does so at the cost of increasing
what many believe to be "windfall" gains to plaintiffs.o While this
tradeoff might be lamented, it is also unavoidable under current
punitive damages doctrine. However, because punitive damages
doctrine is focused on the defendant's culpable wrongdoing, this re-
sult is not especially troubling.
The Article unfolds in three Parts. In Part I, we provide some
background and then examine a critical threshold issue that has
been ignored by litigants, courts, and scholars: whether plaintiffs
are, under current state tort law, permitted to make punitive dam-
ages jurors tax aware. If so, plaintiffs would be able to argue to ju-
rors that they should augment punitive damages awards to account
for tax deductibility by defendants. Furthermore, once tax evi-
dence is introduced, it could also be considered by reviewing courts
in assessing the constitutionality of punitive damages under the
Due Process Clause.
Oddly, as a matter of current practice, plaintiffs (through their
counsel) have not been seeking to introduce tax evidence against
defendants when seeking punitive damages. In fact, to our knowl-
edge, this precise issue has never been raised in any reported deci-
o A number of problems have been identified with extending windfalls to plaintiffs,
such as decreased incentives for plaintiffs to take adequate precautions and increased
incentives to bring frivolous suits. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, De-
coupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. Econ.
562, 563 (1991); Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 1909. Additionally,
windfalls provide a kind of lottery gain that, ex ante, citizens would prefer to avoid if
it could alternatively be shared through lower taxes or more services. Eric Kades,
Windfalls, 108 Yale L.J. 1489, 1564 (1999).
To be sure, there is a venerable school of thought that views punitive damages
awards to plaintiffs not as a windfall, but rather as a remedy that vindicates the injury
to a plaintiffs dignity interests in a manner separate from the non-economic compen-
satory damages a plaintiff might receive. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the
Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive
Damages, 118 Yale L.J. 392, 434 (2008); Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Jus-
tice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1432-33 (1993);
Mark A. Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 263, 269-74 (2008); John C. P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest
of Us): Private Law in Disguise, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 3, 7 (2004); Anthony J.
Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 957, 960-62, 1023-
29 (2007) (arguing that punitive damages should be regarded as "a form of state-
sanctioned revenge"); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 Tex.
L. Rev. 105, 107, 110, 151-53 (2005).
2010] 1301
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sion by any American court. Part I therefore also considers the ar-
guments both in support of and against making jurors tax aware
when they are deciding the amount of punitive damages. Ulti-
mately, Part I concludes that, under current tort law, jurors should
be made tax aware. Accordingly, the problem of under-punishment
could be corrected without the necessity of any legislative action.
This discussion should thus be of substantial interest to tort liti-
gants and courts; indeed, we think that plaintiffs' lawyers will be
especially interested to learn that they are able to introduce tax
evidence that would increase their clients' punitive damages recov-
eries.
Part II then analyzes which of the two solutions to the under-
punishment problem-tax awareness or nondeductibility-is bet-
ter, given the goals and constraints of current punitive damages law
as practiced in most states. While tax awareness would solve the
under-punishment problem, a universal rule of nondeductibility
could as well, at least in theory. After all, in each case the intent is
for the defendant to bear the same after-tax cost. However, as
mentioned earlier, there is good reason to think that a rule of non-
deductibility would be easily circumvented through settlement. For
this reason, tax awareness is more likely to achieve settled tort law
goals than the alternative solution of blanket nondeductibility. Part
II therefore should be of significant interest to Congress when it
considers whether to implement the nondeductibility approach that
has been regularly touted, most recently by President Obama. Part
III raises and addresses some possible objections to our proposal.
I. THE UNDERAPPRECIATED ISSUE OF JURY TAX AWARENESS
In this Part, we explore how jury (or judicial) tax awareness can
operate as a way to solve the under-punishment problem identified
by torts and tax scholars and, more recently, President Obama. As
mentioned at the outset, a principal purpose of current punitive
damages law in almost all states is to punish a defendant for repre-
hensible conduct. Punitive damages that are incurred in connection
with the defendant's business are tax deductible." Over the last few
" I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006) (allowing deductions for ordinary and necessary business
expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business); Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 58
("Amounts paid as punitive damages incurred by the taxpayer in the ordinary con-
[Vol. 96:12951302
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decades, a number of articles have argued that Congress should
change this tax rule to avoid a "reduction in the sting" of the jury's
intended punishment.12 The Obama administration's recent pro-
posal, like prior similar legislative proposals, is premised on this
same notion of under-punishment.13 In cases where punitive dam-
ages are deductible, the argument is that defendants are under-
punished relative to the jury's intentions.14 This is because the af-
ter-tax cost of the jury's award is less than its nominal dollar
amount.
For example, assume that a defendant in a 40% marginal tax
bracket makes a deductible punitive damages payment of
$100,000." Had the defendant not been forced to make the punitive
damages payment, the defendant would have been left with only
$60,000 of the $100,000 cash paid to the plaintiff. This is because
the government would have received the remaining $40,000 (that
is, 40% of the extra $100,000 of taxable income that had been shel-
tered by the punitive damages deduction). Accordingly, the after-
tax cost to the defendant is only $60,000.16 More generally, in cases
where punitive damages are deductible, the after-tax cost to the de-
fendant is equal to the product of (a) the nominal dollar amount of
the punitive damages and (b) 1 minus t, where t is the defendant's
marginal tax rate.
This under-punishment argument, however, makes the critical
implicit assumption that jurors currently are and will always be
"tax blind" regarding the fact and effect of deductibility in busi-
duct of its business operations are deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense under section 162 of the Code.").
See sources cited supra note 3.
See General Explanations, supra note 5.
1 See supra note 4.
" This is roughly the top effective marginal federal, state, and local income tax rate
that could currently apply to a given defendant. Tax scholarship typically uses this
figure in examples. See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, Compaq Redux: Implicit Taxes and the
Question of Pre-Tax Profit, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 821, 833 (2007).
"This is similar to the "matching contribution" effect resulting from the charitable
contribution deduction. See Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer's Perspective on Section
527 Organizations, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1773, 1776-77 (2007) (showing that a $1000
deductible contribution costs a 35% marginal tax bracket donor only $650, with the
remaining $350 effectively paid by the government).
2010] 1303
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ness-related cases." If jurors were in fact made tax aware, they
would be able to adjust or "gross up" a punitive damages award to
reflect the fact of deductibility. Indeed, once properly grossed up, a
punitive damages award would inflict the jury's desired punish-
ment, and the under-punishment argument in favor of making pu-
nitive damages nondeductible dissolves.
To illustrate, assume that a jury determines that a defendant's
net worth is $1,000,000 and decides that, to impose an appropriate
punishment, the defendant should pay 10% of its net worth. If the
jury is not aware of the fact that the defendant is able to deduct the
punitive damages award, it would render an award of $100,000.
However, if the defendant's marginal tax rate is 40%, then the af-
ter-tax cost of a deductible punitive damages award levied is only
$60,000, which is $40,000 less than what the jury had intended. Un-
der these facts, the under-punishment argument is forceful because
the jury's intended punishment is blunted by the unforeseen tax
deduction.
But if the jury were properly informed as to the tax conse-
quences of the award, the sting reduction argument loses all of its
force. A tax-aware jury would, in this situation, issue a $167,000
punitive damages award to impose an after-tax penalty on the de-
fendant in the amount of $100,000.18 This grossed-up award of
" This "tax blindness" will be true when jurors, in determining the amount of an
award, either (a) do not think about the tax consequences of paying punitive damages
at all or (b) do think about the tax consequences of paying punitive damages but in-
correctly assume that punitive damages are nondeductible in all instances.
Jurors who do think about taxes may assume nondeductibility for a number of rea-
sons. They may simply assume that punitive payments would be nondeductible. Al-
ternatively, jurors may be aware that statutory fines and penalties are nondeductible,
I.R.C. § 162(f) (2006), and may assume that, by analogy, punitive damages are as well.
Finally, some jurors may infer nondeductibility from the fact that they, under current
practices, are not given information about the defendant's marginal tax rate, a fact
which would be necessary to know to calculate a proper gross up. We recognize that
hypothetically someone could be utterly ignorant of the prevailing tax effects of puni-
tive damages and yet guess that such damages would be deductible. But for reasons
we explain later on, we think most people are not likely to know that punitive dam-
ages can be paid with pre-tax dollars by some defendants but not others. See infra
notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
"A total of $167,000 in pre-tax dollars is necessary to create $100,000 post-tax dol-
lars on the assumption of the application of a 40% marginal tax rate. Except in a few
examples later on where greater specificity is required, we have rounded to the closest
thousand dollars.
[Vol. 96:12951304
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$167,000 would result in an after-tax cost of $100,000 ($167,000
* 60%), which is 10% of the defendant's net worth, consistent with
the jury's intentions. More generally, the amount of a given in-
tended penalty would be grossed up by dividing the intended pen-
alty amount by (1 - t), where t is the defendant's marginal tax
rate. 9
Thus, the threshold doctrinal question that must be considered is
whether plaintiffs, under current state tort law, may inform juries
about the tax consequences of the punitive damages awards that
they render.2 o If so, it would be unnecessary to change the federal
tax rules to avoid "undermin[ing] the role of [punitive] damages in
discouraging and penalizing certain undesirable actions."2 1 Unfor-
tunately, we could not find any reported cases discussing the tax-
awareness issue in the punitive damages context,22 and treatises and
articles have largely ignored the issue.' Our discussions with plain-
" It might appear that this math could be difficult for a lay jury to perform correctly.
We are relatively indifferent regarding whether the jury or the judge is the fact-finder
vis-A-vis the marginal tax rate and the calculation of the gross up. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we will generally refer to jury tax awareness, but the discussion below applies
equally to judges if they are the relevant fact-finder. For further discussion of the pro-
cedural aspects of tax awareness, see infra Section III.B.
'To be clear, we are advocating universal tax awareness by juries. Thus, for exam-
ple, if juries, in crafting an award, are permitted or required to take into account the
amount of profits generated by an activity or during a specific period, these profits
should be expressed in after-tax terms.
21 General Explanations, supra note 5, at 95. However, as we point out later, there
may be other considerations involved in a decision to change the tax rules even if ju-
rors are made tax aware. See infra Part II (discussing whether making punitive dam-
ages nondeductible or making jurors tax aware would be the better rule).
, The New York State Bar Association Tax Section, in its 2001 report on the taxa-
tion of punitive damages, found that "[s]tate laws dealing with punitive damages do
not address the issue" of whether juries are instructed as to deductibility. NYSBA
Reort, supra note 3, at 1214.
We have found scant treatment of the issues. One treatise, Schlueter, supra note 2,
at 96-99, adverts to the issues briefly but without any substantial argument or citation
to authorities. That treatise limits its principal discussion of the defendant's taxation
consequences to the following:
Because most punitive damage awards are deductible, the defendant's coun-
sel should be familiar with the local rule regarding the admissibility of tax con-
sequences. A jury may well be swayed by the plaintiff's argument that the puni-
tive damages award will only cost the defendant one-half the amount of its
award in after-tax dollars. The United States Supreme Court held that in trials
involving the Federal Employer's Liability Act, instructions as to tax effects
should have been given. However, most states do not allow such evidence in
state claim actions.
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tiffs' lawyers indicate that they too have not focused on the issue of
tax awareness. 24 Accordingly, as a matter of practice, it appears that
punitive damages jurors are not currently tax aware.
This neglect of the tax-awareness issue is quite surprising in light
of the potentially large dollar amounts that are at stake and the ba-
sic logic that supports the argument that punitive damages juries
should be made tax aware. It seems highly likely that jurors, unless
they are informed of the tax consequences of paying punitive dam-
age awards, either will simply not consider tax consequences at all
Id. § 18.2, at 99 (citations omitted).
Another treatise likewise mentions the issue in passing:
Lastly, the jury should be informed that under federal law, any punitive dam-
ages imposed on a defendant are deductible by the defendant from taxable in-
come. Since the defendant can deduct the expense from its taxes, it thereby re-
duces the deterrent effect of the amount of punitive damages awarded by
whatever its tax rate is. As such, the amount of punitive damages that must be
imposed in order to have a sufficient deterrent effect must be increased to ac-
count for the deduction and the jury should be made aware of that fact.
Mark P. Robinson Jr. & Sharon J. Arkin, Punitive Damages, in 3 American Associa-
tion for Justice, Litigating Tort Cases § 28:36, at 90 (2009) (citation omitted).
A few studies have also referred to the issue briefly. The New York State Bar Asso-
ciation Report on the Deductibility of Punitive Damages noted that state laws have
not addressed the issue of admissibility of the defendant's tax consequences to rebut
the notion that allowing deductibility would unduly reduce the sting of a punitive
damages award. NYSBA Report, supra note 3, at 1213-15. Likewise, Robert Wood
has made the claim that if Congress made punitive damages awards nondeductible,
the jury should be instructed on that fact. Wood appears to assume that juries cur-
rently gross up deductible awards; otherwise, there would be no reason to instruct
them of the fact of nondeductibility. Wood, Further Thoughts, supra note 3, at 1502.
However, there is no evidence to support this inference because it appears there are
no cases where evidence is admitted regarding defendants' marginal tax rates. Like-
wise, another commentator implicitly assumes that jurors currently take into account
tax deductibility of a punitive damages award in determining the size of the award to
support his argument that to reduce the size of the plaintiff's windfall, awards should
be nondeductible for defendants. Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 1918.
As we discuss below, making punitive damages nondeductible would reduce the size
of the awards only if a jury is aware of the tax treatment of punitive damages. If juries
are unaware, the size of the awards would be the same whether or not awards are de-
ductible.
2 One nationally prominent plaintiffs' class action lawyer surmised that the failure
to press the tax argument was predicated on case law precluding admission of tax
treatment evidence-along the lines of the case law excluding admission of insurance
coverage. We have seen no case law to that effect but we address the underlying anal-
ogy to insurance coverage infra at Subsection I.B.5. Several other prominent plain-
tiffs' lawyers thought we were spot-on in identifying the oversight of the plaintiffs'
bar. In any event, we do not suggest that we have exhaustively surveyed the world of
practice and would welcome more empirical information one way or the other.
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or instead will incorrectly assume that these damages are always
nondeductible.' In either case, introducing into evidence the fact
of deductibility and informing the jury of the effect of deductibility
would often increase the punitive damage award substantially. For
example, if the defendant's marginal tax rate is 40%, making jurors
tax aware would augment a punitive damages award by 67%.
Making jurors tax aware in such a case would increase the stan-
dard 33% contingent fee by 22% (one-third of 67%) of the origi-
nal, pre-grossed-up amount of the punitive damages award.' Fur-
thermore, since settlements are reached in the shadow of what a
jury would be expected to award, the prospect of gross ups would
similarly increase settlement values. Plaintiffs' lawyers would
therefore appear to have strong financial incentives to argue for
jury tax awareness, though, as mentioned earlier, they are appar-
ently not doing so.
We discuss below, in Sections A and B respectively, the doc-
trinal arguments both for and against tax awareness under current
state tort law. Ultimately, we conclude that the argument in favor
of tax awareness is more persuasive.
A. Arguments for Tax Awareness
The arguments in favor of making juries tax aware are straight-
forward. First, the tax evidence is relevant information, like the de-
' This is a factual premise of the proposals to make punitive damages nondeduct-
ible because if jurors were grossing up damages then there would be no under-
punishment problem. The premise seems reasonable to us given that most law stu-
dents (and law professors) we spoke with were surprised to learn that punitive dam-
ages incurred in connection with a business are deductible. Cf. Inland Revenue
Comm'rs v. Alexander von Glehn & Co., (1920) 2 K.B. 553, 570-71 (stating that the
answer to the question of whether a defendant can deduct fines from his business in-
come is an "obvious" no). Even if some jurors were aware of the fact and effect of
deductibility despite the fact that they are not presented with evidence such as the
marginal tax rate of the defendant, informing them about tax consequences and mar-
ginal tax rates would simply make these "inherently" tax-aware jurors more tax
aware. For example, without explicit tax awareness, inherently tax-aware jurors might
incorrectly estimate the defendant's marginal tax rate, which would result in errone-
ous gross-up amounts.
' Recall the example above where tax awareness increased a $100,000 award by
$67,000 in the case of a 40% marginal tax bracket defendant.
' Thus, if a jury intended a penalty of $100,000 on a 40% marginal tax bracket de-
fendant, the gross up would equal $67,000. One-third of the gross up is $22,000, which
equals 22% of the original, pre-gross-up amount of the punitive damages.
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fendant's financial condition, that a jury should consider in design-
ing an appropriate financial punishment. Second, tax awareness fa-
cilitates the reduction of unwarranted disparities among similarly
situated defendants.
As discussed earlier, a principal purpose of punitive damages
law in virtually all states is to impose a financial setback on the de-
fendant to punish its reprehensible conduct. The problem with the
current practice of tax blindness is that a jury cannot decide the
amount of a proper punitive damages award without also knowing
how much of the award the defendant will actually have to pay. To
determine the real cost of punitive damages awards, jurors must be
informed about the defendant's tax consequences of paying puni-
tive damages.28 Thus, like net worth evidence and other similar evi-
dence relating to the defendant's financial condition, evidence re-
garding the fact and effect of deductibility is relevant in calculating
the size of an appropriate punitive damages award.29
2 Cf. John Y. Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes, and Damage Payments and Recov-
eries, 25 Tax L. Rev. 611, 615 n.5 (1970) (arguing that to determine whether deducti-
bility of a fine dilutes an intended penalty, one needs to know whether the imposer of
the fine believed that the fine was deductible); Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxa-
tion: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 343, 352 (1989)
("Whether a policy of disallowing deductions increases a penalty or prevents dilution
of the intended penalty depends on the government's intent when setting the primary
fine. If the government intended the fine to be deductible, then a policy of nonde-
ductibility increases the sanction; similarly, if the government intended the fine to be
nondeductible, then a policy of deductibility reduces the sting."); see also Wood, Fur-
ther Thoughts, supra note 3, at 1502 (contending that if punitive damages were made
nondeductible, "there must be a fundamental change in the information provided to
juries so they take into account the after-tax effects of the punitives").
29For purposes of this Article, we accept without argument the conventional as-
sumption that business defendants are permissibly punished in a way similar to indi-
viduals and that wealth-adjusted penalties are reasonably imposed on business enti-
ties. A normative justification for this claim with respect to intermediate civil
sanctions is offered in Dan Markel, Punishing Entities (Civilly) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). A range of justifications and authorities have been offered
for punitive sanctions against firms. See, e.g., Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, Corpo-
rations, Crime and Accountability 15 (1993) ("[T]he law should hold an axe over the
head of a corporation that has committed the actus reus of a criminal offence. ... The
private justice system of the firm is then put to work under the shadow of that axe.");
Peter French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (1984); Amy J. Sepinwall,
Shared Responsibility for Corporate Crime (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (explaining how corporate criminal liability can be justified in terms of
retributive theory); see also N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212
U.S. 481, 492-93 (1909); Regina v. St. Lawrence Corp., [1969] 2 O.R. 305, 5 D.L.R. 3d
[Vol. 96:12951308
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Second, tax blindness results in unwarranted disparate treatment
of otherwise similarly situated defendants. For example, assume
that Defendant A, a self-employed courier, drives recklessly to de-
liver a package on time, while Defendant B drives similarly to get
to a movie on time. Assume also that each defendant injures and
causes the same harm to a victim, and each defendant is in the
same financial position. In both cases, a tax-blind jury awards
$100,000 of punitive damages, believing that both defendants' af-
ter-tax cost will equal the same amount. Yet, because Defendant
A's driving was in the course of her courier business, she gets to
deduct the $100,000, reducing her after-tax cost to $60,000.
By contrast, because his driving was not business-related, De-
fendant B receives no reduction in his after-tax cost. Thus, while
the degree of reprehensibility is the same and each defendant's fi-
nancial position is the same, Defendant B is punished more harshly
than Defendant A. This inequity would be resolved, however, if
the punitive damages judgment against Defendant A were prop-
erly grossed up by a tax-aware jury to $167,000.
Of course, it might be argued that Defendant A and Defendant
B are not similarly situated because Defendant A was pursuing a
taxable benefit (earning his courier fee) while Defendant B was
pursuing a tax-free benefit (seeing the beginning of a movie).
While this distinction is accurate, it is hard to see why it is one that
is relevant in determining the amount of the financial punishment
that each defendant should bear.
Besides creating inequity between business and non-business
taxpayers, current tax blindness creates inequities among business
defendants that are subject to different marginal tax rates. If two
defendants with the same net worth injure a victim similarly in the
263, 273-74 (Can.); Melissa Ku & Lee Pepper, Corporate Criminal Liability, 45 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 275, 277 (2008). To be sure, some law and economics scholars reject the
notion that businesses (or, at least, public corporations) can sensibly be punished even
though they think the businesses can be deterred. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869,
948-54 (1998). Thus, it is possible that such scholars will view "under-punishment" as
appropriate if the amount of punitive damages is nevertheless sufficient to achieve
optimal deterrence. However, at least one economist has argued that wealth-based
punitive damages are appropriate for business entities in certain instances. See Keith
N. Hylton, A Theory of Wealth and Punitive Damages, 17 Widener L. Rev. 927, 946
(2008).
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course of their business and one defendant has a higher current-
year marginal tax rate than the other, then that defendant's after-
tax punishment would be less than the other defendant's sanction.'
This inequity would likewise be solved by making jurors tax
aware.31
B. Assessing the Arguments Against Tax Awareness
In response to these arguments in favor of tax awareness, a
number of interrelated counterarguments may be offered. These
arguments, however, are ultimately not fully persuasive.
1. Symmetry Between Plaintiffs and Defendants
Defendants could first note that information regarding the tax
consequences of awards to plaintiffs is sometimes not allowed into
evidence,32 and then argue that consistency and fairness require
that the same rule of tax blindness be followed in the punitive
damages context vis-ft-vis defendants. Defendants are generally not
allowed, in an effort to reduce the amount of damages awarded
against them, to introduce the fact that Section 104(a)(2) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code allows physically injured plaintiffs to exclude
'0 See Pace, supra note 3, at 849-50. Because marginal tax rates depend on the
amount of the taxpayer's current year income (not on the amount of the taxpayer's
accumulated wealth), it is possible for two similarly wealthy taxpayers to be subject to
different marginal tax rates in the current year.
3 There is another type of horizontal inequity that could arise. One could argue
that, under a tax-awareness scheme, plaintiffs who are similarly situated (for example,
a plaintiff who is run over by Defendant A and experiences the same injury as a plain-
tiff run over by Defendant B) will enjoy different recoveries under our proposed rule.
However, given the defendant-centered goals of punitive damages (to punish and de-
ter), this is not a significant concern. Under current punitive damages law, if Defen-
dant A were wealthier than Defendant B, their respective victims would frequently
receive disparate amounts of punitive damages. See infra Subsection I.B.3.
3 The Second Restatement of Torts includes this general rule in § 914A, and the
commentary notes that this is the rule in the majority of jurisdictions. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 914A, at 494 (1979). But see Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444
U.S. 490, 496-98 (1980) (holding that the tax-free status of an award under the appli-
cable statute was admissible); Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 295-98
(9th Cir. 1975) (holding that if a defendant requests an instruction regarding tax ex-
clusion, the court must give it); Blake v. Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 484 F.2d 204, 208 (2d
Cir. 1973) (same); Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1248-51 (3d
Cir. 1971) (same).
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compensatory damages from gross income.33 To illustrate why de-
fendants would want to introduce this evidence, consider a case
where a plaintiff suffers lost wages of $100,000. Assuming that the
Section 104(a)(2) exclusion applies, damages representing lost
wages would not be taxed. The defendant therefore would want to
introduce the fact that, had the lost wages been earned in due
course, the plaintiff's after-tax income from the wages would equal
$60,000 (assuming a 40% marginal tax rate). Thus, the defendant
would argue to the jury, the plaintiff should be awarded only
$60,000 of lost wages damages instead of $100,000.
Courts have generally, though not universally, precluded defen-
dants from making this type of argument to juries.' Courts faced
with the argument must decide whether the benefit of the Section
104(a)(2) exclusion should go to the plaintiff or to the defendant. If
the Section 104(a)(2) exclusion is not admitted into evidence, then
the plaintiff will capture the benefit because the plaintiff will re-
ceive $100,000 of after-tax damages for lost wages, even though the
plaintiff has in fact lost only $60,000 of after-tax wages. If the Sec-
tion 104(a)(2) exclusion is admitted into evidence, the defendant
will capture the benefit because it will pay only $60,000 of lost
wages even though it caused the plaintiff to lose $100,000 of such
wages.
This choice creates a dilemma. Compensatory tort damages are
conventionally thought to fulfill two goals: to compensate the
plaintiff for his or her injury and to promote optimal deterrence by
forcing the defendant to internalize the tortious costs of its activi-
ties." The Section 104(a)(2) exclusion makes it impossible to
achieve these two goals simultaneously. The exclusion thus forces
courts to choose between (i) over-compensating plaintiffs through
tax blindness by making jurors tax blind as to the effects of Section
104(a)(2), or (ii) under-deterring-from a cost-internalization per-
" I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006) (specifically excluding compensatory damages received
on account of personal physical injury from gross income).
' See, e.g., John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety of Taking Income Tax into
Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or Death Action, 16 A.L.R. 4th
589, § 3, at 594-99 (1982) (providing citations to many jurisdictions that do not allow
defendants to introduce tax effects on awards to plaintiffs).
" Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale L.J. 347,
390 (2003) [hereinafter Sharkey, Punitive Damages] (discussing "the predominant
dual functions of tort law-compensation and deterrence").
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spective-defendants by making jurors tax aware as to the effects
of Section 104(a)(2).16 Faced with this dilemma, courts have gener-
ally (though not universally) chosen over-compensation rather
than under-deterrence, a reasonable choice though not an indis-
putable one.
In the punitive damages context, there is no such difficult di-
lemma. Tax awareness will further the punishment objective of pu-
nitive damages without adversely affecting any other purpose of
punitive damages." Thus, while the issue of Section 104(a)(2)
awareness is a difficult one that requires a balancing of conflicting
objectives, tax awareness in the punitive damages context is a far
easier choice.
In addition, it should be noted that while courts generally have
followed a rule of tax blindness in the Section 104(a)(2) context,
this rule is by no means universal. For example, the United States
Supreme Court has determined that the effect of Section 104(a)(2)
ought to be considered by courts in determining an award under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA").3 Under the
FELA statute, an estate is entitled to a recovery of "the dam-
ages. .. [that] flow from the deprivation of the pecuniary benefits
which the [decedent's] beneficiaries might have reasonably re-
ceived . . . ." The Court held that such language mandates the use
of after-tax earnings in assessing the proper amount of damages
because "[i]t is... after-tax income, rather than... gross income
before taxes, that provides the only realistic measure of [the dece-
dent's] ability to support his family."' Accordingly, the Court de-
termined, "[i]t follows inexorably that the wage earner's income
tax is a relevant factor in calculating the monetary loss suffered by
3 See Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 143, 146 (1992) [here-
inafter Dodge, Taxes and Torts] (noting that § 104(a)(2) "forces states to choose be-
tween overcompensating plaintiffs and potentially underburdening defendants").
"The assumption here, which we think is uncontroversial, is that most jurisdictions
permitting punitive damages are thus pursuing retribution and complete deterrence of
the underlying misconduct, not optimal deterrence. Even the leading proponents of
optimal deterrence agree that current punitive damages law in most states is not de-
signed or structured in such a way as to achieve optimal deterrence. See Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 29, at 896-97.
* Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493, 498 (1980).




his dependents when he dies."4' Lower federal courts have followed
this tax-awareness rule in other cases involving federal causes of
action for lost earnings.42
Furthermore, a growing number of courts have implemented a
rule of tax awareness regarding the plaintiff's tax consequences in
employment discrimination cases. In these cases, plaintiffs have
sought an augmented award to counteract the effect of certain ad-
verse tax consequences that they would suffer as a result of receiv-
ing a lump sum payment of lost wages in lieu of the periodic wages
that they would have received absent the discrimination. State and
federal courts have generally allowed such augmentations in cases
applying a range of anti-discrimination laws.43
2. Complexity and Speculation
In opposition to a plaintiff's attempt to introduce tax evidence, a
defendant might also argue that this evidence would cause undue
complexity and result in too much speculation by the jury. In a re-
lated context, a similar argument has met with some success. In
some personal injury cases, for example, defendants have sought to
introduce evidence that plaintiffs are allowed to exclude compen-
satory damages, including lost wages, from gross income for tax
41 Id. at 493-94.
42 See, e.g., Kirchgessner v. United States, 958 F.2d 158, 161 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a plaintiff's tax consequences may be introduced under the Federal Tort Claims
Act); Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a plaintiff's tax
consequences may be introduced in claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Fanetti v.
Hellenic Lines Ltd., 678 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that the tax-awareness
rule in Liepelt applies at least to all federal law claims for future lost wages).
4 See Gregg D. Polsky & Stephen F. Befort, Employment Discrimination Remedies
and Tax Gross Ups, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 67, 91-99 (2004). The Third Circuit recently af-
firmed such an award under the Americans with Disabilities Act, noting that in craft-
ing an appropriate remedy to restore the plaintiff to its ex ante economic position,
these adverse tax consequences should be considered. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc.,
554 F.3d 426, 440-43 (3d Cir. 2009). An earlier Tenth Circuit decision reached the
same conclusion in a Title VII case, Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
749 F.2d 1451, 1456-57 (10th Cir. 1984), as have a number of other federal and state
courts in applying various anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 447 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Arneson v. Sullivan, 958
F. Supp. 443, 446 (E.D. Mo. 1996); see also Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, Dist. No. 160, 87 P.3d 757, 761-64 (Wash. 2004) (applying Wash-
ington discrimination law); Ferrante v. Sciaretta, 839 A.2d 993, 994-96 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 2003) (applying New Jersey discrimination law).
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purposes. To determine the value to the plaintiff of this tax exclu-
sion, a jury must determine how lost future wages would have been
taxed had they been earned in due course." As the Restatement
(Second) of Torts explains in support of its rule that defendants
may not introduce evidence of the exclusion to the jury:
[T]he calculation of the potential income tax for future earnings
is a very complicated one, fraught with many imponderables,
such as the potential number of exemptions or exclusions, the tax
bracket that the injured party would be in because of income
from other sources and the uncertainty as to the tax rate in the
future.45
These concerns about undue complexity and speculation, how-
ever, are not nearly as significant in the punitive damages context.
Ordinarily, calculating punitive damages gross ups would be rela-
tively simple. The jury would need only to determine the defen-
dant's expected marginal tax rate for the defendant's current tax-
able year, as punitive damages are payable in a lump sum rather
than over a period of years." Once the marginal tax rate is known,
the jury's intended penalty is grossed up by dividing that intended
after-tax penalty amount by (1 - t), where t is the defendant's mar-
ginal tax rate.47 Thus, while the benefit of the Section 104(a)(2) ex-
clusion might depend on marginal tax rates that will apply in multi-
ple and distant years in the future, a punitive damages gross up
"For example, if a jury decides that the plaintiff suffered lost future wages in the
amount of $100,000 per year for the next thirty years, a tax-aware jury would have to
speculate as to the plaintiffs marginal tax rate during that time period in order to de-
termine the amount of lost after-tax wages.
45 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 914A, at 495 (1979).
* While appeals could delay the defendant's payment and resulting deduction until
later tax years, and marginal tax rates might change before the deduction is taken, de-
fendants can take steps to protect themselves from any harm caused by a reduction in
their marginal tax rate. Tax law allows defendants to deduct immediately contingent
liabilities (such as an adverse judgment pending appeal) by paying the amount of the
contested liability into an escrow account. See I.R.C. § 461(f) (2010). This would ef-
fectively "lock in" the defendant's marginal tax rate at the rate to which the defen-
dant is subject during the year of the jury verdict. Accordingly, the possible delay
from appeals and its effect on the marginal tax rate applied to a payment of punitive
damages can safely be ignored in grossing up these awards.
' If a punitive damages payment causes a defendant to "drop" tax brackets, a
blended rate must be used to properly gross up the intended penalty. This would
make the math somewhat more complex but not inordinately so.
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would depend only on the single marginal tax rate for the current
year.
That said, gross-up calculations could involve some degree of
complexity in certain cases. The defendant's marginal tax rate for
the current taxable year is known with precision only after the end
of that year. Thus, for example, a jury determining the amount of
punitive damages early in the defendant's taxable year would have
to speculate as to what the defendant's taxable income will be for
the rest of that year. This would be a significant concern only with
regard to defendants whose short-term profitability is highly vola-
tile.
Nevertheless, even in these cases, the complexity concerns ne-
cessitated by gross ups are significantly less profound than those
associated with determining the amount of damages generally.'
After all, in determining the amount of compensatory damages, ju-
ries are often required to speculate as to "future employment.. . ,
future health, future personal expenditures, future interest rates,
and future inflation. . . ."49 All of these issues involve significant
conjecture about future events, yet juries deal with them to the
best of their abilities, usually with expert assistance."o We think that
juries should be allowed to do the same in estimating the marginal
tax rate for the defendant's current taxable year." If juries are not
allowed to do so, the marginal tax rate of all defendants is effec-
tively assumed to be zero, which would be substantially erroneous
in many cases.
3. Augmenting Windfalls
In addition to the symmetry and complexity arguments previ-
ously discussed, defendants might also argue that tax awareness
' Cf. Mark Geistfeld, Due Process and the Determination of Pain and Suffering
Tort Damages, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 331, 331-33 (2006) (arguing that due process con-
cerns also arise in the compensatory damages category).
4NoTfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 494 (1980).
" Id.
" Thus, for example, to determine future medical costs, the jury must speculate both
as to the plaintiffs future medical needs and as to the plaintiff's life expectancy. A
jury would never be able to predict each of these with precision, yet this does not pre-




will unduly augment the size of the plaintiff's windfall.52 Some
scholars have argued, however, that punitive damages awards to
plaintiffs are not always properly construed as windfalls in all cases;
rather, these awards can sometimes be justified as compensation of
an injury to a particular dignity interest held by the plaintiff that is
not currently accounted for by compensatory damages.53 If these
scholars are correct, then the concern about extra windfalls is miti-
gated or possibly eliminated in some cases.
Even assuming that the windfall characterization were appropri-
ate-a reasonable assumption if the plaintiff is already compen-
sated adequately by compensatory damages"-the augmentation
argument does not persuasively refute the need for tax awareness.
While the size of the plaintiff's recovery would in fact be increased
through tax awareness, when evidence regarding deductibility is
excluded from the jury's consideration, the jury's intended sanction
is blunted." The question then is which of the two evils-
augmented windfalls for plaintiffs or blunted penalties for defen-
dants-is worse. It is clear that current punitive damages law in
most states is focused on defendants, their conduct, and their fi-
nancial circumstances. In endeavoring to get the defendant's
52 Augmented windfalls are problematic for reasons we discuss below and adverted
to earlier. See supra note 10. Of course, plaintiffs and their counsel must be suffi-
ciently compensated to assure litigation of worthy punitive damages claims. Making
punitive damages nondeductible would marginally reduce this compensation vis-A-vis
a deductible regime. The question is whether such a reduction would cause plaintiffs
and attorneys to forgo litigation of worthy claims.
See generally sources cited supra note 10.
Even if these scholars were not correct, the now-prevalent use of Philip Morris
instructions, which require the jury to forbear from punishing the defendant in an
amount of punitive damages that includes the harms to non-parties, may also reduce
the larger concern regarding the prospect of unduly large windfalls to plaintiffs. See
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353-55 (2007).
" Congressional legislative history suggests that this is Congress's view. H.R. Rep.
No. 104-586, at 143 (1996) ("Punitive damages are intended to punish the wrongdoer
and are not intended to compensate the claimant (e.g., for lost wages or pain and suf-
fering). Thus, they are a windfall to the taxpayer and appropriately should be in-
cluded in taxable income.").6 In addition, as described above, if the jury fails to take into account tax deductibil-
ity in crafting punitive damages awards, it will result in disparate treatment of simi-
larly situated defendants. See discussion supra Subsection I.B.1.
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treatment right, punitive damages law in most states appears un-
concerned with the size of the plaintiff's windfall.
Thus, for example, a victim injured by a wealthy malicious tort-
feasor will, all else being equal, receive a larger windfall than that
received by a victim of a poor malicious tortfeasor. Yet this possi-
bility has not prevented the fact of the tortfeasor's wealth from be-
ing introduced to the jury. Likewise, the prospect of augmented
plaintiffs' windfalls should not prevent the fact of deductibility
from being admitted into evidence so as to give the jury the requi-
site tools to impose a financial penalty on the defendant that it
deems appropriate."
4. Award Sizes
Defendants could also argue that punitive damages awards are
larger than they normatively ought to be; therefore, the blunting
effect achieved by tax blindness is beneficial. Fortunately for de-
fendants, the Supreme Court over the last two decades has in-
stalled a series of constitutional checks on both the amount of pu-
nitive damages that can be awarded and the procedures through
which those awards may be made." This has been coupled with ag-
" Some states have experimented with or adopted split-recovery schemes, in part to
address windfalls. See Sharkey, Punitive Damages, supra note 35, at 372-89.
" Awards of punitive damages, even when augmented, would still be subject to judi-
cial review for compliance with constitutional legal norms.
" The Court's due process requirements in regards to punitive damages can be
summed up in six rules. First, when courts review the constitutionality of punitive
damages awards, the most important factor that they must consider is the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (restating the rule that punitive damages will only
be awarded where a defendant's conduct is so reprehensible that it justifies an award
in addition to compensatory damages). The Court has further specified a number of
factors that contribute to a determination of reprehensibility. See BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-77 (1996) (listing recidivism, vulnerability of victims,
deceit, and violence as factors indicating a greater degree of reprehensibility). Second,
reviewing courts must also consider whether "the disparity between the actual or po-
tential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award" is constitu-
tionally excessive. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418. More controversially, in State Farm,
the Court established a presumption that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will
satisfy due process." Id. at 425. Third, reviewing courts should consider "the disparity
between the punitive damages award and the 'civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases."' Id. at 428 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). Fourth, reviewing
courts, under the Supreme Court's new Philip Morris decision, must ensure that the
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gressive efforts at the state level to achieve tort reform through the
imposition of caps, multipliers, and other limits on the amount of
punitive damages awarded.' These efforts might make blunting
through tax blindness unnecessary. Furthermore, recent empirical
evidence suggests that the current sizes of punitive damages awards
predictably track the sizes of compensatory damages awards.61 If
true, this evidence arguably undermines the claims made by those
who contend that punitive awards are systematically too high.
Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that punitive damages
awards are "too large," fixing this problem through tax blindness
would not be the optimal approach. Under a rule of tax blindness,
there would be no blunting effect whatsoever in cases where the
plaintiff's claim did not arise out of the defendant's business. Be-
cause defendants in those cases do not get any deduction for pay-
ments of punitive damages, they would be required to bear the full
cost of excessive awards. Furthermore, even in cases arising out of
the defendant's business, the degree of blunting would be depend-
ent on the defendant's marginal tax rate, with the greatest blunting
occurring in cases where the defendant's marginal tax rate is high-
est. If punitive damages awards are systematically too high, then
blunting should instead occur systematically and evenhandedly.
jury does not impose on defendants an amount that includes the harms to non-parties
to the litigation. See Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353. One might see this rule as related
to the Court's stated interest in ensuring that states refrain from punishing defendants
for conduct lawfully performed in other states. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421. Fifth, judi-
cial review of a jury's award of punitive damages must be available. See Honda Motor
Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994) (holding that Oregon's denial of judicial
review for punitive damages awards violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause). Finally, appellate review of punitive damages must apply a de novo
standard of review of the jury's award, at least in a federal case. See Cooper Indus.,
Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435-36 (2001).
6 See generally Rustad, supra note 2.
61 See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, Nicole Waters, & Martin T.
Wells, The Decision to Award Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 2 J. Legal
Analysis (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 22-24, available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1412864) (reporting findings that challenge the
claim that punitive damages are unduly high or erratic); Sebok, supra note 10, at 962-




5. The Analogy to Insurance Evidence
Defendants might argue that, because evidence of insurance
coverage is generally inadmissible, tax evidence should likewise be
inadmissible.62 Insurance evidence is somewhat analogous because
insurance blindness, like tax blindness, could result in lower than
intended penalties inflicted on punitive damages defendants.
As an initial matter, it should be noted that in some states insur-
ance coverage for punitive damages has been determined to be
contrary to public policy because of under-punishment concerns.'
In those states, the analogy is not helpful to those advocating for
maintaining tax blindness because insurance for punitive damages
would never exist; as a result, jurors could never be insurance
blind.
In states where insurance is available to cover punitive damages,
it is not altogether clear that plaintiffs may not introduce evidence
of such insurance in the punitive damages phase of the trial. Insur-
ance coverage has generally been admissible to rebut the defen-
dant's claim that it lacked the financial resources to pay a punitive
damages award.' There appear to be no cases addressing the issue
62 Cf. supra note 24.
63 See, e.g., N.W. Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962)
(finding that disallowing punitive damages coverage ensures that the wrongdoer suf-
fers the intended sanction). For a useful overview of the punitive damages coverage
issue, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64
Md. L. Rev. 409 (2005) [hereinafter Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs).
Courts that have allowed punitive damages insurance coverage have focused on the
fact that, under the specific language in the insurance contract, insured parties would
expect that punitive damages are covered and that a public policy prohibition would
upset those expectations. See, e.g., Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383
S.W. 2d 1, 5 (Tenn. 1964) (noting that "the average policy holder reading [the insur-
ance policy's] language" would expect punitive damages coverage). Thus, courts al-
lowing punitive damages coverage have determined that the contractual expectations
of the insured trump the under-punishment concern. See Sharkey, Revisiting the
Noninsurable Costs, supra, at 436 (describing how "courts have increasingly weighed
the absence of any punitive damages exclusion as a strong factor in favor of conclud-
ing that punitive damages fall within the policy's coverage"). Accordingly, the avail-
ability of punitive damages insurance coverage in some states should not be viewed as
an expression that those states are unconcerned about under-punishment.
' See, e.g., Schaefer v. Ready, 3 P.3d 56, 59 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000); Wilder v. Cody
Country Chambers of Commerce, 933 P.2d 1098, 1108 (Wyo. 1997); Wheeler v. Mur-
phy, 452 S.E. 2d 416, 426 (W.Va. 1994); see also Edward M. Swartz & Elly D. Swartz,
3 Handbook of Pers. Inj. Forms & Litig. Materials § 6:46.140 (2d ed. 2010) (providing
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of whether insurance evidence may be admitted if it is not solicited
in rebuttal to a lack of resources claim.
Assuming that a state allows punitive damages coverage and that
evidence of such coverage is inadmissible, is there a good argument
that jurors in that state should be tax aware even while they are in-
surance blind? We think there is, because insurance awareness
would implicate significant collateral public policy issues that
would not be affected by tax awareness. If punitive damages juries
were insurance aware, juries might routinely add the insurance lim-
its to their intended punishment amount. Thus, if the insurance
policy's limit is $100,000 and the jury intends to inflict a $100,000
punishment on the defendant, an insurance-aware jury might
award $200,000 because it knows that the first $100,000 will be cov-
ered by insurance. The effect is that the market for punitive dam-
ages would be distorted. This is because the defendant effectively
pays exemplary damages twice: once ex ante in the form of the ad-
ditional premiums for punitive damages coverage and then again
ex post in the form of the increased jury award." As a result, one
might be concerned that on the one hand, if jurors were made in-
surance aware, the market for insurance for punitive damages
would disappear in those states where courts have determined that
an example of a motion in limine arguing that the plaintiff should be able to introduce
punitive damages insurance coverage in the punitive damages phase of the trial).
" See Gerald Reading Powell & Cynthia A. Leiferman, Results Most Embarrassing:
Discovery and Admissibility of Net Worth of the Defendant, 40 Baylor L. Rev. 527,
533-34 (1988) (noting that admitting insurance coverage for punitive damages would
cause the defendant to "lose[] the benefit of its foresight in obtaining liability cover-
age, for the jury will discount the coverage before assessing punitive damages," and
therefore concluding that "the defendant might benefit more without any liability
coverage"). Alternatively, jurors might decide to award no punitive damages against a
covered defendant, on the theory that the insurance company would bear the burden
of the punitive damages award up to the policy limits. Cf. Fleegel v. Estate of Boyles,
61 P.3d 1267, 1272-73 (Ala. 2002) (noting that the defendant solicited punitive dam-
ages insurance evidence during the trial, after which the jury awarded zero punitive
damages despite finding that the conduct warranted them). This effect would, like the
augmentation effect described in the text, be problematic. It would change the
amount of liability attributable to a tort depending on whether or not the defendant
was insured. A self-insured defendant would pay the full punitive damages award,
while an insurance company insuring the defendant would pay a discounted award.
This would distort the punitive damages insurance market by creating an artificial in-
centive for defendants to acquire such insurance in lieu of self-insuring.
[Vol. 96:12951320
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such insurance does not violate public policy.' On the other hand,
there is no risk that tax awareness would have any similar perverse
collateral consequences.'
6. If There is a Problem, Federal Tax Law Should Fix It
Defendants may argue that, because Congress could easily make
punitive damages nondeductible, state courts should not take it
upon themselves to solve the under-punishment problem. There
are two significant problems with this argument. First, as we argue
below in Part II, it is likely that the nondeductibility solution
would, in practice, be far inferior to the tax-awareness approach in
addressing under-punishment. Second, a variety of federalism and
regulatory diversity concerns, also detailed in Part II, push strongly
in favor of a state, rather than federal, solution to the under-
punishment problem.
7. Summary
In sum, plaintiffs should be allowed to introduce evidence re-
garding tax deductibility of punitive damages awards. The ambigu-
ity surrounding the issue appears to stem principally from the fact
that plaintiffs' lawyers have not yet pressed the issue, despite the
potentially large stakes involved and the good arguments in favor
' See Powell & Lieferman, supra note 65, at 533-34 (concluding that insurance
awareness would make defendants who purchased punitive damages insurance cover-
age worse off than those who did not). If, however, the effect of introducing punitive
damages insurance evidence is to lower punitive damages awards, the punitive dam-
ages insurance market would be distorted in the other direction as described in supra
note 65.
61 In addition to the perversity of this result (that is, the destruction of an insurance
market that has been determined not to be contrary to public policy), it can be argued
that punitive damages insurance is normatively desirable on a number of grounds, in-
cluding mitigating the effects of false positive errors in adjudication. See Dan Markel,
How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383, 1393-98 (2009) (ex-
plaining why insurance for recklessness-based punitive damages should be allowed on
retributivist grounds, and why insurance for punitive damages should be allowed
when those damages are facilitating either optimal deterrence or victim vindication
for dignity losses otherwise uncompensated by standard compensatory damages); see
also David G. Owen, Products Liability Law § 18.5, at 1237 (2d ed. 2008) ("When the
law is poorly defined and poorly administered... , the risk of undeserved punitive
damage awards is substantial, making insurance contracts for such events more rea-
sonable.").
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of admissibility. While defendants can make some facially plausible
arguments in opposition, upon closer inspection these arguments
are not persuasive. We therefore believe that under current tort
law in most states plaintiffs should be able to make jurors (or
judges) aware of the tax consequences of payments of punitive
damages.'
C. Constitutional Implications
The preceding analysis presents significant implications for the
constitutional review of punitive damages. Consider the case of
State Farm v. Campbell, where the Supreme Court set aside a jury's
$145 million punitive damages award because the amount of the
award violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' In so doing, the Court announced that "few awards exceed-
ing a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory dam-
ages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process."o
Importantly, nothing in the opinion reveals that the Court (or any
lower court) was aware of the fact that the defendant, a large in-
surance company, would have been able to deduct the punitive
damages at issue. We have thus far argued that Campbell's lawyers
should have enlightened the trial court as to the fact and effect of
such a deduction, but this would have likely been fruitless in this
particular case because the Court found even the non-grossed-up
amount excessive.
Nevertheless, the State Farm case seems to leave open the ques-
tion of whether, in assessing the constitutionality of punitive dam-
ages awards, courts should focus on the pre-tax amount of the
award or its after-tax cost. For example, in applying the single-digit
multiplier presumption," should courts compare the compensatory
damages to the nominal (pre-tax) amount of the award or to the
m Of course, if punitive damages were made nondeductible, then defendants should
be able to introduce this fact to the jury so the jury is not tempted to adjust upward on
the basis of conjecture. Also, to the extent that profitability of an activity or a certain
period is relevant to the determination of a punitive damages award, these facts
should be expressed to the jury in after-tax terms. In short, we propose universal tax
awareness in calculating punitive damages under current state tort law.
6 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417-29 (2003).
70 Id. at 425.
" See id.
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actual (after-tax) cost of the award? Business defendants would
clearly prefer to use the nominal amount of the award to keep the
presumptive ceiling where it is. To accomplish this, defendants
might point to the language of State Farm, which focuses on the
nominal amount of the award.72
This argument, however, is not persuasive because the Court
never addressed the defendant's tax consequences. Indeed, it likely
never realized that the after-tax cost of the award might have dif-
fered substantially from the nominal award. Even if the Court were
generally aware of the fact of deductibility, no evidence of the de-
duction's value to the defendant was presented during the course
of litigation. Furthermore, because the majority in State Farm
found its rejection of the 145:1 ratio of nominal punitive damages
to compensatory damages "neither close nor difficult,"" even if the
Court were inherently aware of tax consequences, a tax adjustment
likely would have made no difference to the disposition of that par-
ticular case. Thus, any suggestion that State Farm itself addressed
the constitutional tax-awareness issue places far too much weight
on mere dicta.
The Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause to prohibit
"grossly excessive" punitive damages awards,74 and the application
of the single-digit ratio presumption is intended to help courts as-
sess when punitive damages awards become unconstitutionally ar-
bitrary deprivations of property. Because the due process analysis
focuses on the amount of property deprivation, courts should focus
on the after-tax actual cost of the award because that is the amount
that represents the real financial setback imposed upon the defen-
dant. To focus on nominal or pre-tax amounts, which in some cases
will equal or closely approximate after-tax costs and in other cases
will not, would introduce unnecessary arbitrariness into the proc-
ess. To more accurately assess the punitive force of damages on the
defendant, courts applying the due process analysis should focus on
the after-tax costs to the defendant in cases where the relevant tax
evidence has been introduced.
2 Id. at 429.
" Id. at 418, 425-26.
74 Id. at 416.
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Needless to say, this reasoning provides another significant in-
centive for plaintiffs' lawyers to introduce tax evidence in punitive
damages trials against business defendants. Not only will tax-aware
juries, all else being equal, render higher punitive damage verdicts,
but, in our view, tax-aware judges would raise the ceiling on consti-
tutionally permissible awards."
II. IMPROVING THE TAXATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In this Part, we consider the appropriate taxation of punitive
damages, leaving current state tort law constant. The principal is-
sue is whether business-related punitive damages should remain
deductible. Over the years, a series of proposals have argued that
these damages ought to be made nondeductible to prevent federal
tax law from "undermin[ing]" the role of punitive damages in "dis-
couraging and penalizing certain undesirable actions or activities.""
The premise of the proposals is that, under current tax law, the af-
ter-tax cost of punitive damages awards is lower than that intended
by juries. Such a premise assumes, however, that juries are and will
continue to be tax blind. As we discussed in Part I above, the as-
sumption that tax blindness will invariably persist is not warranted
because the issue of tax blindness has not yet been addressed by
state courts.
As we have already argued, the stated goal of President
Obama's reform proposal-ensuring that the jury's intended pun-
ishment is imposed to buttress the state law goals of punitive dam-
ages law-could be achieved simply by making jurors tax aware.
The question then becomes which of the two solutions to the un-
der-punishment problem-either states making jurors tax aware or
the federal government making punitive damages nondeductible-
" State Farm also reiterates that reviewing courts should compare the amount of the
punitive damages award to the amount of "civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases." Id. at 428 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
575 (1996)). In order to make an appropriate apples-to-apples comparison, courts
should compare the after-tax costs of such penalties. As we discuss below, civil penal-
ties are nondeductible, so these nominal amounts should be compared to the tax-
adjusted amount of deductible punitive damages. See infra Section III.D (describing
the tax treatment of civil fines and comparing such treatment to the taxation of puni-
tive damages).
7
'See, e.g., General Explanations, supra note 5, at 95; see also supra notes 6-8 and
accompanying text (quoting the Obama proposal).
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is preferable. As we show below, the answer depends principally
on the degree to which a rule of nondeductibility might be circum-
vented through settlements disguising punitive damages as com-
pensatory damages, as the latter would remain deductible under
either proposal."
A. Assuming Perfect Enforcement
We will initially assume that the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") would be able to perfectly enforce a rule of nondeductibil-
ity. This would mean that the IRS would readily be able to deter-
mine the value of the punitive damages portions of settlements.
The IRS could then deny deductions for that portion of the defen-
dant's settlement payments. As we explain below, we believe that
in fact it would be exceedingly difficult for the IRS to determine
the punitive damages portions of settlements, and accordingly, that
a rule of nondeductibility would be practically unenforceable. Nev-
ertheless, to illustrate the stakes involved, we begin our analysis by
assuming that the IRS would be able to perfectly enforce a rule of
nondeductibility.
Under this perfect-enforcement assumption, the defendant
would be indifferent regarding the choice between the two ap-
proaches-making jurors tax aware or making punitive damages
nondeductible-to the under-punishment problem. The after-tax
cost to the defendant would be the same in each case because a
tax-aware jury would adjust a deductible award to inflict the de-
sired after-tax penalty. Thus, if the jury intended an after-tax pen-
alty of $100,000, it would render a $167,000 award if the award
were deductible and a $100,000 award if it were not. Under either
approach, the defendant's after-tax cost would be $100,000. The
" We do not believe that Congress would seriously entertain a rule of nondeducti-
bility for compensatory damages. Such a rule would result in significant over-
deterrence because ex ante precautionary measures would be deductible while com-
pensatory damages would not. While current punitive damages law is not concerned
with the risk of over-deterrence, non-punitive damages tort law is concerned with this
risk. In any event, none of the prior proposals for nondeductibility have proposed
making compensatory damages nondeductible. Accordingly, we assume throughout
that the taxation of compensatory damages would remain unchanged. But cf. Alfred
F. Conard, Who Pays in the End for Injury Compensation? Reflections on Wealth
Transfers from the Innocent, 30 San Diego L. Rev. 283, 292, 299-300 (1993) (explor-
ing the argument that even compensatory damages should be nondeductible).
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defendant therefore would be indifferent as to which of the two so-
lutions is chosen.
But the choice of solutions would, under a perfect enforcement
assumption, have an impact on the plaintiff and the federal gov-
ernment. This can be inferred from the fact that both solutions to
the under-punishment problem increase the defendant's after-tax
cost by $40,000, from $60,000 to $100,000. This $40,000 must go to
some party and the only other actors at the scene are the plaintiff
and the government.
To show that only the plaintiff and the government care about
the issue if enforcement were perfect, consider again an example
where a tax-aware jury would award $167,000 under a deductible
regime and $100,000 under a nondeductible regime. Assume also
that (i) the defendant earns $167,000 of gross income before taking
into account any deduction that it might receive for paying punitive
damages, (ii) the defendant has no deductions other than any de-
duction that it might receive from paying punitive damages, and
(iii) the plaintiff, like the defendant, is subject to a 40% marginal
tax rate. The net after-tax consequences to the plaintiff, the defen-
dant, and the government under these facts are shown in the fol-
lowing chart.
[Vol. 96:12951326
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" As noted earlier, amounts have been rounded. The defendant's taxable income is
$0 because the $167,000 deduction for the punitive damages award shelters all
$167,000 of her gross income.
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There are several significant conclusions to draw from this chart.
First, the defendant's after-tax financial status is unaffected by the
choice of solutions; this is expected as it is the explicit purpose of
gross ups. If jurors were made tax aware, the jury's award would be
$167,000. There would be no tax liability for the defendant because
the deduction for paying the award would shelter all of the defen-
dant's gross income. Nevertheless, the defendant ends up with $0
because all of the defendant's gross income goes towards paying
the punitive damages award. If, however, punitive damages were
made nondeductible, the jury's award would be $100,000. In that
case, the defendant would have $167,000 of taxable income
($167,000 of gross income less zero deductions"), resulting in
$67,000 of taxes due.' The $67,000 of taxes due and the $100,000
nondeductible jury award would consume all $167,000 of the de-
fendant's gross income. Again, the defendant is left with $0.
But the plaintiff is affected by the choice of solutions. If tax
awareness is chosen, the plaintiff's after-tax result is $40,000 higher
than if nondeductibility were chosen. This is because a tax-aware
jury would gross up the plaintiff's award by $67,000 before tax to
offset the defendant's economic benefit of its deduction for paying
punitive damages. After the plaintiff pays 40% tax on the $67,000
augmentation, the plaintiff is left with an extra $40,000.
Meanwhile, if the nondeductibility solution is chosen, then the
government's tax revenues increase by this $40,000 amount (going
from $67,000 to $107,000). With tax awareness, the entire $167,000
award is taxed only once-to the plaintiff. With nondeductibility,
the $100,000 award is taxed twice-as part of the defendant's in-
come and then again when awarded to the plaintiff; the remaining
$67,000 of the defendant's gross income is taxed only once-to the
defendant.
Thus, under conditions of perfect enforcement, the choice of so-
lutions affects only the plaintiff and the government-either the
plaintiff ends up with the extra $40,000 (applying a rule of tax
awareness) or the government does (using a nondeductibility
" The defendant has no deductions because the assumed facts indicate that it will
have no deductible expenses other than any deduction that is available for paying the
punitive damages award.
'The tax on $167,000 of taxable income is 40% of $167,000 or $67,000.
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rule)-but not the defendant. Accordingly, the important norma-
tive question in deciding between the solutions to under-
punishment would be whether the plaintiff or the government
should end up with this extra $40,000.
Who should get this gain? Under current punitive damages law
in most states, and as Congress seemingly understands these dam-
ages, the plaintiff's recovery of such awards is generally viewed as a
windfall." If true, there is no compelling reason to enlarge the
windfall by choosing the tax-awareness solution.' As long as suffi-
cient incentives exist under the current tax-blindness rule for plain-
tiffs to pursue worthy punitive damages cases, the federal govern-
ment could, by making punitive damages nondeductible,
simultaneously correct under-punishment while also generating
additional tax revenues without any resulting deadweight loss to
society." Furthermore, windfalls are undesirable because people
are risk-averse; as a result, they prefer guaranteed lower taxes or
greater services as opposed to the unlikely prospect of a large
windfall, even where these two options have the same risk-adjusted
value.'
To be sure, others argue that compensatory damages are insuffi-
cient to compensate the plaintiff fully for her injuries," especially
after litigation costs are considered." Accordingly, awards of puni-
tive damages may not be properly characterized as complete wind-
falls under those arguments. Under the nondeductibility solution,
plaintiffs would receive the same amount of after-tax punitive
damages as they do under the current situation of tax blindness
combined with deductibility. Unless one believes that plaintiffs are
" See Kades, supra note 10, at 1562-64 (summarizing views of punitive damages as
windfalls); Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 1903; see also H.R. Rep. No.
104-586, at 143 (1996) (revealing Congresspersons' views that punitive damages are
windfalls to taxpayers).
2 See generally Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 1917.
* Kades, supra note 10, at 1564.
*See id.
8 See Sebok, supra note 10, at 1007 and other sources cited supra note 10. The point
here is that the victim vindication theorists believe that there exists a private wrong
requiring redress for an insult to dignity that was not otherwise addressed in the non-
economic damages associated with the plaintiff's receipt of compensatory damages.
* See, e.g., Dodge, Taxes and Torts, supra note 36, at 167 (arguing that legal fees




currently under-compensated even where they win an award of
punitive damages, our proposal of gross ups from tax awareness
would constitute increased windfalls.
Even if one believes that plaintiffs are systematically under-
compensated under current tort law, this problem is best resolved
directly and comprehensively, not through punitive damages gross
ups. First, punitive damages are relatively uncommon and there-
fore the increased awards would apply only to a small number of
cases.' Second, gross ups would only mitigate the under-
compensation problem in punitive damages cases arising out of the
defendant's business; in all other punitive damages cases, the plain-
tiff's recovery would be unaffected. Third, since the amount of
gross ups depends on the defendant's marginal tax rate, the
amount of under-compensation relief would vary from plaintiff to
plaintiff even in cases arising out of the defendant's business.
In any event, it is not necessary for policymakers to decide who
should get the gains created by solving the under-punishment prob-
lem. Once we relax the perfect enforcement assumption, it be-
comes clear that a rule of nondeductibility would be quite easy for
litigants to circumvent in the vast majority of punitive damages
cases. As we explain below, the likely result is that the government
would be unable to capture any significant part of the gains created
by under-punishment correction.
B. Relaxing the Assumption of Perfect Enforcement
1. Circumventing the Nondeductibility Rule
In practice, it will be quite difficult for the IRS to enforce a rule
of nondeductibility in cases that settle before a jury verdict is
reached. Settlements usually resolve all of the plaintiff's claims,
whether compensatory or punitive, at once. To enforce effectively
a rule of nondeductibility for punitive damages, the amount paid
by a defendant to settle a case must be allocated between the com-
pensatory portion, which would be deductible, and the punitive
portion, which would not be. Such allocations will be difficult for
the IRS to make for a variety of reasons.
" See generally Eisenberg, supra note 61 (collecting and summarizing data showing
punitive damages are uncommon).
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First, there appears to be no intrinsically correct way to make
these allocations. To illustrate this problem, assume that a personal
injury plaintiff suffers a $1,000,000 injury and that the plaintiff has
a 50% chance of proving that the defendant is liable for the injury.
Assume further that, if the defendant is liable, there is a 50%
chance that the defendant will be required to pay $1,000,000 in pu-
nitives and a 50% chance that the defendant will not be required to
pay any punitives.' Under these facts, risk-neutral parties would
value the claim at $750,000. If the case settles for that amount,
how much of the $750,000 should be allocated to the plaintiff's pu-
nitive claim?
On the one hand, the plaintiff has received less than the amount
of the harm ($1,000,000) that she has incurred. This is because the
value of the plaintiff's claims is discounted to reflect the chance of
a defense verdict. Because the plaintiff is not "made whole," it
might appear that the entire $750,000 should be allocated to com-
pensatory damages.' In addition, the plaintiff had only a one-in-
four chance of receiving a punitive damages award;" this low prob-
ability could also be viewed as supporting the view that the entire
settlement amount ought to be allocated to the compensatory
claim.
On the other hand, if the plaintiff's punitive claim did not exist,
the value of her cause of action would be only $500,000 (instead of
" In other words, there is only a 50% chance that the jury will find the defendant's
conduct sufficiently malicious to justify a punitive damages award.
"There is a 50% chance that the plaintiff will recover nothing because that is the
chance of a defense verdict on the underlying claim. There is a 25% chance that the
plaintiff will recover $1,000,000 because that is the chance that the plaintiff will win
the compensatory claim but lose the punitive damages claim; this chance has a value
of $250,000. There is a 25% chance that the plaintiff will recover $2,000,000 because
that is the chance that the plaintiff will win both the compensatory and punitive
claims; this chance has a value of $500,000. The combined value of these chances is
$750,000.
* Cf. Rev. Rul. 75-230, 1975-1 C.B. 93 (ruling that settlement proceeds will first be
allocated to previously deducted medical expenses because they represent a sum cer-
tain, while amounts paid for pain and suffering are speculative).
" The plaintiffs chance of receiving a punitive damages award is only 25% because
(i) the plaintiffs chance of a compensatory award was 50% and a compensatory
award is a condition to receiving a punitive damages award, and (ii) even after the
plaintiff wins the compensatory award, there is a 50% chance that the jury would
choose not to award punitive damages.
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$750,000).' This is because the punitive damages claim had an ex-
pected value of $250,000 (or a one-in-four chance at $1,000,000).9"
This suggests that $250,000 of the settlement amount ought to be
allocated to punitive damages.94
The hypothetical above was highly stylized and unrealistically
simple. The specific amounts of the different types of damages, as
well as the specific probabilities of the plaintiff's success, were
known precisely by both parties. Plaintiffs will generally be more
risk-averse in pursuing such litigation than defendants or their in-
surance companies, in part because only the latter typically have a
diversified "portfolio" of litigation; this factor would affect and
likely reduce settlement values. But, a defendant might also be
risk-averse because of the potential for significant adverse collat-
eral effects of a punitive damages judgment (publicity, insurance
coverage problems, etc.); this factor would likely increase settle-
ment values. Introduction of these real-world complexities makes
allocations incredibly difficult, even as a theoretical matter.
In addition to these conceptual difficulties, there would be sig-
nificant practical obstacles to making settlement allocations. Allo-
cations depend on the relative values of the plaintiff's compensa-
tory and punitive claims. Several factors make this valuation
exercise onerous. First, there is currently no market for selling or
2 Absent the punitive claim, the plaintiff would have a 50% chance of winning
$1,000,000; the value of that chance is $500,000.
" That is, there exists a 25% chance of a $1,000,000 punitive award. The plaintiffs
chances of receiving the punitive damages award was only 25% because (i) the plain-
tiff's chance of a compensatory award was 50% and a compensatory award is a condi-
tion to receiving a punitive damages award, and (ii) even after the plaintiff wins the
compensatory award, there is a 50% chance that the jury would choose not to award
punitive damages.
' The Eighth Circuit used this sort of reasoning to uphold an allocation of $500,000
to punitive damages in a case where the settlement amount equaled the amount of
compensatory damages awarded by the jury. Bagley v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue,
121 F.3d 393, 393-94, 397 (8th Cir. 1997). In that case, the jury awarded $1,500,000 of
compensatory damages and $7,250,000 of punitive damages. Id. at 394. While an ap-
peal was pending the case was settled for $1,500,000. Id. The settlement agreement
allocated none of the amount to punitive damages, and the taxpayer's tax return re-
flected that position. Id. The court concluded otherwise, noting that the taxpayer's
"argument that none of the settlement is taxable requires us to believe that this po-
tential liability did not affect the size of the settlement at all, and thus, that [the de-
fendant] paid nothing to [the taxpayer] to secure a release from this sizable expo-
sure." Id. at 395.
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buying pre-trial tort claims, and the vast majority of claims settle
quietly. Second, the value of the plaintiff's claims usually depends
on the individual attributes of the plaintiff and the defendant, and
on the specific acts that form the basis of the lawsuit.95 For these
reasons, it would often be very difficult to find any "comparable
sales" that are useful in valuing the plaintiff's respective claims.
As a result, the valuation exercise will typically require specula-
tion as to what a jury would have awarded had the case gone to
trial. This usually would allow defendants to make a plausible con-
tention that none of the settlement payment should properly be al-
located to punitive damages. Punitive damages require a specific
jury finding that the defendant acted in a morally reprehensible
manner, a fact that is inevitably hotly disputed by the litigants. Fur-
thermore, compensatory damage components such as pain and suf-
fering damages, lost future wages, and future medical expenses are
often subject to an extremely wide valuation range, thus making it
easy for defendants to attempt to allocate large amounts of a set-
tlement to these components of compensatory damages. Accord-
ingly, defendants would be able to take extremely aggressive posi-
tions on allocations without much risk of penalties if these
allocations were successfully contested by the IRS.
As a result of this low risk of penalties, a nondeductibility rule
would rarely be self-enforcing. Instead, the IRS would have to find
good settlements to challenge. While jury verdicts involving puni-
tive damages may be reported in newspapers or legal periodicals,
pre-trial settlements rarely are. The IRS would, as a result, be re-
quired to review court pleadings and other public documents to try
to uncover, out of the entire universe of pre-trial settlements, those
settlements that involve the compromise of viable punitive dam-
ages claims. Because (as we discuss below) both litigants would be
able to participate in the benefits of circumventing a rule of non-
deductibility, litigants would have strong incentives to minimize the
" But see Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run of the Mill Justice, 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
1485, 1490 (2009) (discussing certain litigation contexts where tort valuations occur in
a relatively predictable manner); Alexandra D. Lahav, Rough Justice and the Prob-
lem of Value in Tort Law (Working Paper, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=156 2 677 (same).
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apparent value of the plaintiff's punitive damages claim in the pub-
lic record.'
Making matters even worse, courts tend to put an undue amount
of weight on self-serving allocations made by litigants in written
settlement agreements.' There is no benefit (tax or otherwise) to
be gained by either party in making explicit allocations to punitive
damages; however, there are often tax, insurance, or public rela-
tions benefits to be gained by avoiding explicit allocations to puni-
tive damages." As a result, settlement agreements routinely and
expressly allocate the entire amount to compensatory damages."
Given the mutually self-serving nature of these allocations, they
should not be assumed to reflect the true nature of the plaintiff's
claims. But courts have given these self-serving, agreed-upon allo-
cations some degree of weight." These courts seem not to consider
" Cf. Kevin A. Palmer, Recent Developments in the Taxation of Punitive Damage
Awards, 73 Taxes 596, 600 (1995) (arguing that, because punitive damages in personal
physical injury cases are taxable while the related compensatory damages are not,
plaintiffs should avoid making punitive damages claims in their initial complaint to
strengthen the evidence in support of the plaintiffs later tax claim that the entire set-
tlement should be allocated to compensatory damages).
See, e.g., McKay v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 465, 482 (1994), vacated on other grounds,
No. 94-41189, 1996 WL 248936, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 10, 1996) (noting that an express
allocation in a settlement agreement is "the most important factor" in allocating pre-
trial settlements); Byrne v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 1000, 1007 (1988) (same).
9 See Robert W. Wood, 522-3d Tax Mgmt. (BNA), Tax Aspects of Settlements and
Judgments, at A-33 (2006) (noting that, even leaving aside tax considerations, "it
would be highly atypical for a settlement agreement to acknowledge that any portion
of the settlement was being paid on account of punitive damages" and that "[v]irtually
no defendant would agree to such a characterization"); Bagley v. Comm'r, 121 F.3d
393, 396 (8th Cir. 1997) ("It will almost never be to a defendant's advantage to allo-
cate part of a lump-sum settlement to punitive damages, and it will often be disadvan-
tageous. Often, insurance policies will not cover such awards, and punitive-damage
awards result in worse publicity than compensatory awards. Most plaintiffs will not
want specific allocations to punitive damages in their settlement agreements, because
punitive damages are taxable.").
9 See Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment into Compensation: In the Shadow of
Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 211, 218 (1998) (noting that not one of thirty
prominent personal injury lawyers interviewed "reported ever settling a case for an
amount that included a portion identified as 'punitive damages'); Wood, supra note
98, at A-33 (stating that an allocation to punitive damages would be "highly atypi-
cal"); see also Bagley, 121 F.3d at 396 n.7 (noting that the defendant's attorney, "an
experienced Iowa litigator, told the Tax Court that he could recall no settlement with
which he had been involved that specifically allocated a certain amount to punitive
damages in the settlement agreement").
'n See sources cited supra note 97.
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the fact that, no matter how adversarial the parties are throughout
most of the litigation, at the point of settlement the parties' inter-
ests in reducing the tax burdens of the settlement are perfectly
aligned."o' Nevertheless, in light of the respect that many courts
give to these self-serving allocations, the burden of proof effec-
tively shifts from the taxpayer (on whom this burden is nominally
placed) to the IRS to show why a reallocation is appropriate.'" As
a result, to challenge a defendant's self-serving allocation, the IRS
would be forced to relitigate the plaintiff's underlying claims long
after the case was settled and without the benefit of a financially
interested plaintiff. Accordingly, even if the IRS were somehow
able to find good settlements to challenge, these proof problems
would make it very difficult for the IRS to be successful in winning
these challenges.
For these reasons, we expect that a rule of nondeductibility
would be readily circumvented in cases that settle prior to a jury
verdict. An extremely large percentage of tort cases already settle
under current law,o" and as we explain below, a rule of nonde-
ductibility should serve only to increase the settlement rate." Ac-
cordingly, we expect that, under a rule of nondeductibility, circum-
vention through disguised settlements would be the norm, not the
exception.o
" Not all courts fall victim to this problem. See, e.g., Bagley, 121 F.3d at 396 (noting
that "when the time comes to settle a case, no matter how adversarial the proceedings
have been to that point, the parties will almost always be in agreement that no part of
a settlement agreement should be explicitly allocated to punitive damages").
" See Brent B. Nicholson & Douglas K. Chapman, Enforceability of Settlement
Agreement Allocations Under Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 47
Baylor L. Rev. 97, 113 (1995) (arguing that making express allocations in settlement
agreements "shift[s] the debate to the issue of enforceability, which ... [should be] an
easier argument [for the taxpayer] to win").
' See John C.P. Goldberg et al., Tort Law: Responsibilities and Redress 40 (2d ed.
2008) (observing that only 3% of all torts suits reach a jury verdict and that settle-
ments or dismissal resolves the rest of claims).
See infra Subsection II.C.2.
That said, in some cases, circumvention of the nondeductibility rule might not be
possible. For example, if the "settlement gap" (that is, the gap between what the
plaintiff thinks the case is worth and what the defendant thinks the case is worth) is
large enough, the gains from circumvention would not be large enough to induce liti-
gants to settle. Likewise, if the plaintiff has a strong enough desire to "have her day in
court," the gains from circumvention might not be large enough to sway the plaintiff.
In addition, if the maximum amount of compensatory damages can be easily ascer-
tained, putting at least a minimum value on the punitive damages portion of a settle-
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The alternative solution to the under-punishment problem-
making jurors tax aware-is not easily circumvented through set-
tlement. Gross ups, in addition to increasing jury verdicts, would
increase settlement values because litigants determine these values
in the shadow of what a jury would be expected to award. Thus, de-
fendants could not avoid any part of the under-punishment correc-
tion resulting from gross ups simply by settling before trial.
2. Effect of Easy Circumvention
If we are correct that a rule of nondeductibility would typically
be circumvented, what would be the effect of such a rule? First, the
defendant's after-tax cost of settlement would be lower than the
penalty that a jury would intend to impose, though it would be
higher than the after-tax cost borne by the defendant under current
law. Thus, in terms of correcting under-punishment, a rule of non-
deductibility would be better than current law but not as good as
the alternative option of making jurors tax aware. Second, the
plaintiff's windfall would be higher than it is under current law, but
lower than it would be under the alternative solution of making ju-
rors tax aware.
To illustrate these effects, consider again the case where a jury
would, if the case went to trial, render a punitive damages award
with an after-tax cost of $100,000. Assume that if the case were set-
tled before a jury verdict, the defendant would be able to deduct
the entire settlement amount because the punitive damages could
be disguised as additional compensatory damages. But if the case
ment would be easy. Thus, for example, if a plaintiff is defrauded out of $10,000, and
the case settles for $100,000, it would be easy for the IRS to assert that at least $90,000
of the settlement is attributable to punitive damages (assuming that there is no possi-
bility that the plaintiff would have recovered attorney's fees and ignoring the possibil-
ity of prejudgment interest). In personal injury cases, however, the amount of com-
pensatory damages is usually not easy to ascertain, primarily because pain and
suffering awards are very difficult to predict but also because the amounts of lost
wages and future medical costs are often the subject of much dispute. In addition,
conflicts of interest could impede mutually beneficial settlements in certain cases. Cf.
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (2009) (ex-
plaining that conflicts of interest between attorney and client and among multiple cli-
ents can affect settlement decisions in the nonclass aggregation context). One source
of potential conflicts relates to tax: contingent fee arrangements are typically based on
the pre-tax amount of the plaintiffs recovery; however, the plaintiff is interested in
maximizing the after-tax recovery.
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proceeds to a jury verdict, none of the award would be deductible
because at that point it would be clear that the $100,000 payment
by the defendant constitutes a payment of punitive damages.
Under these facts, the defendant would prefer settling for any
amount up to $166,667 to paying a jury verdict of $100,000 because
the after-tax cost of the former would be less than the after-tax cost
of the latter. Meanwhile the plaintiff would prefer settling for any
amount over $100,000 to receiving a jury verdict of $100,000. Thus,
there is a settlement "sweet spot" between $100,001 and $166,666
where both parties would be better off by settling than going to
trial. The only question is how the settlement surplus is distributed.
A settlement of $100,001 would distribute the surplus almost en-
tirely to the defendant, while a settlement of $166,666 would dis-
tribute it almost entirely to the plaintiff.
Both parties must agree to settle to obtain the surplus. If either
party holds out, the case will proceed to trial, the jury will award a
$100,000 nondeductible award, and the surplus will be lost. Be-
cause obtaining the surplus requires mutual cooperation, the dis-
tribution outcome will be a function of the parties' bargaining. As-
sume for now that, as a result of this bargaining, the surplus is
divided equally." A settlement of $133,333 would accomplish this,
as shown below:
"For nearly 30 years, scholars in experimental economics have deployed variations
on the "Ultimatum Game" to understand the reasons and extent to which people co-
operate when there are gains to divide and opportunities to punish those who do not
play "fairly." For a description of the Ultimatum Game, see Manuel A. Ustet, Recip-
rocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior, and Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capi-
tal-Financed Firms, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 45, 124-27 (2002); see also Hessel Oosterbeek
et al., Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-
Analysis, 7 Experimental Econ. 171 (2004) (providing a meta-analysis of studies in-
volving the Ultimatum Game).
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By settling, the plaintiff and the defendant are each $20,000
richer than they would be had they gone to trial. This means that
(i) the defendant's after-tax cost is $20,000 less than the correct
penalty-the one that a jury would have imposed had the case pro-
ceeded to trial, and (ii) the plaintiff's windfall is $20,000 greater
than if the case had proceeded to trial.
Nevertheless, relative to current law, this brings the punishment
closer to that which the jury would have intended. Under current
law, the defendant would always pay $100,000 regardless of
whether a settlement was reached or the case went to trial, because
there would be no tax benefit to be gained by settling. The chart
below compares that result with the $133,333 settlement reached
under a nondeductible regime:
Plaintiff After- Defendant Af-
tax Benefit ter-tax Cost
Go to trial; $100,000 - $100,000 -
$100,000 (non- (40% of 0 =
deductible by $100,000) = $100,000
Defendant) $60,000
jury award
Settle for $133,333 - $133,333 -
$133,333 (de- (40% of (40% of
ductible by De- $133,333) = $133,333) =
fendant) $80,000 $80,000




Thus, a rule of nondeductibility is better than current law in
terms of reducing under-punishment, though it is not perfect in this
regard. The after-tax cost to the defendant under a nondeductibil-
ity rule falls $20,000 short of the intended punishment of $100,000,
and the after-tax cost would fall $40,000 short under current law. In
addition, a rule of nondeductibility comes at the cost of increasing
the plaintiff's windfall by $20,000 relative to current law.
Consider now the results under the alternative solution of mak-
ing jurors tax aware. Under this scenario, the jury would award
$166,667 if the case went to trial; this would impose the intended
after-tax punishment of $100,000. Because compensatory damages
and punitive damages are taxed the same (that is, they are both
deductible by the defendant), there is no tax surplus to be gained
by settling. The defendant would therefore pay $166,667 regardless
of whether the case settled or went to trial. The after-tax conse-
quences of this result are shown in the chart below under scenario #3:
Plaintiff After- Defendant After-
tax Benefit tax Cost
Scenario #1 $100,000 - $100,000 -
Current law: (40% of (40% of
$100,000 settle- $100,000) = $100,000)=
ment/verdict (de- $60,000 $60,000
ductible by De-
fendant)
Scenario #2 $133,333 - $133,333 -
Nondeductibility (40% of (40% of









In scenario #3, the intended after-tax cost of $100,000 is borne by
the defendant. In terms of correcting under-punishment, therefore,
this scenario is the best. This is because settlements are generally
reached in the shadow of the anticipated jury award." Thus, while
a nondeductibility rule is largely avoidable through settlement, the
effect of tax awareness is not.
Nevertheless, while tax awareness best solves the under-
punishment problem, it does come at the cost of enlarging the
plaintiff's windfall. Unfortunately, to the extent that a rule of non-
deductibility is circumvented, there is simply no way to correct un-
der-punishment without at the same time augmenting the plain-
tiff's windfall.
Plaintiff After- Defendant Af-
tax Benefit ter-tax Cost
Scenario #1 $100,000 - $100,000 -
Current law: (40% of (40% of
$100,000 settlement $100,000) = $100,00)
/verdict (deductible $60,000 $60,000
by Defendant)
Scenario #2 $133,333 - $133,333 -
Nondeductibility (40% of (40% of
rule: $133,333) = $133,333)=
$133,333 settlement $80,000 $80,000
(deductible by De-
fendant)
Scenario #3 $166,667- $166,667-
Tax awareness plus (40% of (40% of
current tax rule: $166,667) = $166,667) =
$166,667 settlement $100,000 $100,000
/verdict (deductible
by Defendant)
Intended after-tax N/A $100,000
penalty
17See Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U.
Chi. Legal F. 201, 241 (1990); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
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Assuming circumvention is relatively easy (as we have argued),
the critical issue is whether reducing a given dollar amount of un-
der-punishment is worth giving the same dollar amount of added
windfall. If so, we conclude that (i) a rule of nondeductibility is an
improvement over current law, but (ii) a rule of tax awareness with
gross ups is even better. If not, we conclude that current law should
be left unchanged because the costs of either solution to the under-
punishment problem (augmented plaintiff windfalls) would exceed
the benefits (reduced under-punishments). Accordingly, a rule of
nondeductibility, such as that proposed by President Obama and
various legal scholars, is never the optimal rule.
3. The Effect of Unequal Surplus Sharing
As mentioned above, where a rule of nondeductibility is circum-
vented through settlement, a tax surplus is created for the litigants
to share. The litigants must cooperate to obtain the surplus because
if either party holds out and forces the case to go to the jury, the
surplus will be lost. Thus far, we have assumed that, as a result of
negotiation, the surplus is shared equally. However, it would be
impossible to predict in any particular case how the surplus would
be shared." Moreover, it is difficult to make generalizations about
whether plaintiffs or defendants would tend to capture dispropor-
tionate shares of the surplus. Ultimately, though, it is not important
to predict how the surplus would be shared. This is because, re-
gardless of whether the plaintiff or the defendant captures the sur-
plus, our conclusions above are unaffected.
Consider the effects, for example, if the settlement surplus in a
case were captured disproportionately by a defendant. Thus, in our
hypothetical, the parties might settle for $101,000. This would
make both parties better off, compared to a jury verdict of
" In fact, it is possible that a bargaining breakdown would prevent the parties from
obtaining the surplus. For example, a failure to agree on how the surplus would be
divided could cause the parties to go to trial, at which point the surplus would be lost
because the IRS would be able to make allocations to punitive damages. This would
be relatively rare because of the fact that almost all litigation currently settles before
trial; thus, we can infer that there are strong, non-surplus-related factors pushing in
favor of settlement. A bargaining breakdown over a surplus would have to trump the
factors that preexist the surplus opportunity.
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$100,000, with the defendant much better off than the plaintiff."
Notice that this result is nearly identical to that obtained under the
current situation (of deductibility combined with tax blindness),
where the defendant would pay $100,000, whether by settlement or
pursuant to a judgment. The only difference is that, under the rule
of nondeductibility, where the surplus is captured mostly by the de-
fendant, a small portion of the defendant's $40,000 under-
punishment is shared with the plaintiff in order to induce the plain-
tiff to cooperate in circumventing the rule. Thus, to the extent that
the tax surplus from circumvention is captured mostly by a defen-
dant, a rule of nondeductibility will have nearly the same impact on
the litigants as current law.
Now assume instead that a plaintiff captures most of the surplus
from a settlement that circumvents a rule of nondeductibility.
Thus, the parties might settle for $165,667. Again, both parties are
better off, but the plaintiff this time is much better off than the de-
fendant.' This result is nearly the same as that obtained from the
alternative solution of making juries tax aware, where the defen-
dant would pay $166,667 regardless of whether the case settled or
proceeded to trial. The only difference is that, under a rule of non-
deductibility, where the surplus is captured mostly by the plaintiff,
a small portion of the surplus created by circumvention is shared
by the plaintiff with the defendant to induce the defendant to co-
operate. With tax awareness, however, the full benefit of the gross
up inures to the plaintiff. Thus, to the extent that the tax surplus
from circumvention is captured mostly by a plaintiff a rule of non-
'a The defendant is better off because his after-tax cost is reduced from $100,000 (in
the case of a nondeductible jury verdict of $100,000) to $60,600 (in the case of a de-
ductible settlement of $101,000). The plaintiff is better off because her after-tax re-
covery increases from $60,000 (in the case of a $100,000 jury verdict) to $60,600 (in
the case of a $101,000 settlement). Thus, of the $40,000 tax surplus gained from cir-
cumvention, the defendant has captured $39,400 ($100,000 - $60,600), and the plain-
tiff has captured $600 ($60,600 - $60,000).
"
0 The defendant is better off because his after-tax cost is reduced from $100,000 (in
the case of a nondeductible jury verdict of $100,000) to $99,400 (in the case of a de-
ductible settlement of $165,667). The plaintiff is better because her after-tax recovery
increases from $60,000 (in the case of a $100,000 jury verdict) to $99,400 (in the case
of a $165,667 settlement). Thus, of the $40,000 tax surplus gained from circumvention,
the defendant has captured $600 ($100,000 - $99,400), and the plaintiff has captured
$36,400 ($99,400 - $60,000).
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deductibility will have nearly the same effect on the litigants as the
alternative solution of making jurors tax aware.
Accordingly, under the best case scenario of surplus sharing,
where the surplus is captured mostly by plaintiffs, nondeductibility
is no better than tax awareness in correcting under-punishment. In
all other cases, tax awareness is better than nondeductibility. And,
under the worst case scenario of surplus sharing, nondeductibility
is no better than current law.
C. Collateral Issues
We have thus far argued that tax awareness appears to be the
best solution to the under-punishment problem based on practical
considerations of litigation dynamics and imperfect enforcement.
Below we discuss a number of collateral issues that might also bear
on the issue. Ultimately, they do not affect our conclusion that tax
awareness is preferable to nondeductibility.
1. Administrative Complexity
a. Complications Associated with a Rule of Nondeductibility
While a rule of nondeductibility would, as we explained, be quite
difficult to enforce when cases are settled before trial, the IRS
would presumably try to do so in some cases."' The IRS would do
this by attempting to allocate portions of pretrial settlements to
punitive damages where the facts suggest that a jury would have
awarded substantial punitive damages had the case gone to trial.
Given the speculation involved in predicting what a jury would
have done and the potentially large stakes involved, disputes be-
tween the IRS and defendants would inevitably arise, resulting in
added costs for taxpayers and the IRS, in addition to an increased
burden on courts.
." Cf. Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51, 52 (making an allocation of a settlement in
the personal injury context to determine which portion of the settlement is attribut-
able to the excludible compensatory portion and which portion is attributable to the
taxable punitive portion for the purpose of determining the plaintiff's tax conse-
quences); see Robert W. Wood, Proposed Nondeductibility for Punitive Damages:
Will It Work?, 100 Tax Notes 99, 103 (2003) (predicting that the rule of nondeducti-




Allocations are already required in some punitive damages to
determine the plaintiffs tax consequences from receiving damages.
In cases arising out of a personal physical injury, a plaintiff's com-
pensatory damages are excluded from gross income under Section
104(a)(2), but this exclusion does not apply to punitive damages.
Accordingly, in settlements of personal physical injury claims that
could have generated punitive damages, a plaintiff must make
these difficult allocations, which will (at least in theory) be evalu-
ated by the IRS. Because of this, one might argue that the marginal
increase in administrative costs that would result from the solution
of nondeductibility would be small. There are, however, two rea-
sons to suspect that this marginal increase would not be insignifi-
cant. First, allocations are required to determine the plaintiff's tax
consequences only in a subset of punitive damages cases, namely
those cases that arise out of the plaintiff's personal physical in-
jury."2 in other cases, no allocation is necessary. A new rule of
nondeductibility would mean that allocations would now be neces-
sary in all cases where there was a possibility of a punitive damages
recovery had the case proceeded to trial.
Second, even in those cases where an allocation is already neces-
sary under current law to determine the plaintiff's tax conse-
quences, the solution of nondeductibility would significantly in-
crease the financial stakes of those allocations. This is because
allocations would now also be significant to the defendant, whereas
when punitive damages were deductible, allocations were signifi-
cant only to plaintiffs. If the plaintiff and the defendant are subject
to the same marginal tax rate, the stakes involved in allocations
would now double."' By raising the stakes of allocations, more
n1 In general, allocations must be made in cases where the claim arises out of a per-
sonal physical injury, because in those cases compensatory damages are excluded
from gross income while punitive damages are included.
"1 To illustrate, assume that a plaintiff settles a personal physical injury claim for
$2,000,000 and that the valuation range of the punitive damages within that claim is $0
to $1,000,000. (Therefore, the valuation range of the compensatory claim is $1,000,000
to $2,000,000.) Under current law, assuming a marginal tax rate of 40%, the amount
at stake with regard to the punitive damages allocation is $400,000. If the plaintiff
were to assert successfully a $0 valuation on the punitive damages claim, all of the set-
tlement would be considered compensatory damages, and she would owe no tax. If
the IRS were to assert a $1,000,000 allocation to punitive damages, the plaintiff would
owe $400,000 ($1,000,000 * 40%) in tax. If the tax law were changed such that puni-
tive damages became nondeductible, the amount at stake would double (assuming the
1344 [Vol. 96:1295
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time, attention, and resources will be applied to allocations by both
taxpayers and the IRS. Thus, not only would a new rule of nonde-
ductibility enlarge the scope of cases where allocations are neces-
sary, it would also increase the stakes of allocations in those cases
where allocations are already necessary under current law.
b. Complications from a Rule of Tax Awareness
Unlike the nondeductibility solution to the under-punishment
problem, tax awareness does not require settlement allocations to
determine the defendant's tax liability. Under a rule of tax aware-
ness, all damages paid would be deductible, whether the damages
are compensatory or punitive in nature. As a result, a rule of tax
awareness would place no additional administrative costs on the
IRS, defendants, or the federal tax courts in determining the de-
fendant's tax liability.
There is, however, a different set of administrative costs associ-
ated with tax awareness: these costs would be borne by litigants
and state and federal non-tax courts. Making jurors tax aware will
generally require expert testimony to inform the jury as to the ef-
fect of deductibility and the mechanics of making gross-up calcula-
tions. In some cases, the defendant's expected marginal tax rate
could be a subject of serious dispute, though in other cases the liti-
gants might stipulate to this fact. Jurors or judges would have to
decide the appropriate marginal tax rate (unless it is stipulated)
and perform the mathematical task of grossing up intended penal-
ties. These tasks may in certain cases be difficult and costly. The
administrative burdens associated with these tasks, however, seem
to pale in comparison to the administrative burdens (discussed
above) of attempting to enforce a rule of nondeductibility. These
administrative burdens nevertheless must be considered in deter-
plaintiff and the defendant are subject to the same marginal tax rate). This is because
the defendant and the plaintiff would then each have $400,000 at stake. That is, if the
$0 valuation on the punitive damages claim prevails, the defendant would be able to
deduct all $2,000,000 of the settlement, thus saving $800,000 ($2,000,000 * 40%) in
taxes. But if the $1,000,000 valuation on the punitive damages claim prevails, the de-
fendant would be able to deduct only $400,000 ($1,000,000 * 40%). Thus, the plaintiff
and the defendant would each have $400,000 at stake regarding the allocation to puni-




mining whether the tax-awareness solution to the under-
punishment problem is worthwhile.
2. An Unintended Incentive to Settle
A rule of nondeductibility would create a tax incentive to settle
in cases where the prospect exists of a jury award of punitive dam-
ages."4 Because pre-trial settlements would generate the tax sur-
plus described above, while post-trial resolutions would not, it can
be expected that, all else being equal, a new rule of nondeductibil-
ity would result in a higher rate of settlement of punitive damages
cases. This incentive to settle is an unintended byproduct of a rule
of nondeductibility. By contrast, no such incentive is created under
the tax-awareness solution because, under that solution, there is no
possibility of a settlement-created tax surplus. This incentive to set-
tle must therefore be considered in comparing the two solutions.
On the one hand, if one believes that settlements should be en-
couraged,"' a position that is debatable, then the unintended incen-
tive to settle resulting from nondeductibility might be considered
beneficial."' On the other hand, if one thinks that settlements, es-
pecially in those cases involving egregious behavior, are problem-
atic, then this incentive to settle is disconcerting."'
H4 It should be noted that the joint incentive to settle early already exists in certain
cases because of the differential treatment of compensatory damages and punitive
damages on the plaintiff side. A rule of nondeductibility would exacerbate this incen-
tive in cases where it already exists.
"' One reason commentators have argued that settlements should be encouraged is
to reduce deadweight litigation costs. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law § 21.4-.5 (7th ed. 2007); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, supra note 10, at
563; David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal to Halve Litigation
Costs, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1721, 1722 (2005) (proposing litigation in every other case by
doubling damages and halving the costs of litigation).
"' Since litigants do not have to pay for the full costs of running the civil justice sys-
tem, taxpayers also benefit from increases in settlements, which cost less for the state
than trials and appeals.
"1 See Baker, supra note 99, at 235 (concluding that settlement allows "the greatest
control over the conversion of punishment into compensation" because parties can
allocate the entire amount as compensatory); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that settlement "should neither be encouraged
nor praised"); Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and
Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 221, 222
(1999) (arguing that courts', commentators', and federal policy's favoritism of settle-
ment is misplaced, and "[a]n appropriate model of the litigation process should bal-
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Regardless, it must be remembered that very few cases proceed
to trial under current law."' The unintended incentive to settle has
the potential to affect only the small percentage of these "settle-
ment-resistant" cases. Furthermore, the availability of a tax surplus
would not affect even some of the settlement-resistant cases. A tax
surplus is unlikely to persuade litigants with widely disparate views
regarding the value of the plaintiff's claim to come to an agree-
ment. Some plaintiffs might insist on "having their day in court"
despite the fact that they could lose money doing so."' Thus, the
incentive to settle will stimulate additional settlements only in a
subset of the already small percentage of cases that do not settle
under current law. Accordingly, whether one believes that addi-
tional settlements at the margin are beneficial or not, the unin-
tended incentive to settle created by a rule of nondeductibility
should not be a significant factor in choosing the solution to the
under-punishment problem.
3. Federalism and Regulatory Diversity Issues
In theory, either of the two solutions-tax awareness or nonde-
ductibility-would solve the under-punishment problem; however,
in practice, tax awareness would solve the problem better, or so we
have argued. Another difference between the two solutions is that
tax awareness is a state law solution while nondeductibility is a
federal solution. Accordingly, federalism and regulatory diversity
issues are implicated in deciding between the two solutions.
These concerns push in favor of the state law solution of tax
awareness. First, the goal of under-punishment reduction is to fur-
ther the state's interests in effectively punishing egregious acts
committed within its borders. This is a traditional state law con-
cern, and there is no practical or legal impediment to states fixing
ance both private and public roles in litigation, to illuminate the roles of both prece-
dent and settlement"); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive
Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 239, 300-01 (2009) (identifying
concerns relating to settlements of punitive damage claims).
". See Goldberg et al., supra note 103, at 40. The settlement rate of punitive dam-
ages cases is likely even higher than the rate for ordinary tort claims. See Baker, supra
note 99, at 228 (stating that, given the benefits of settling punitive damages claims, "it
is almost a wonder that any punitive damages claim goes to trial").
"'E.g., Tamara Relis, "It's Not About the Money!": A Theory on Misconceptions
of Plaintiffs' Litigation Aims, 68 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 701, 720-33 (2007).
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the under-punishment problem on their own through tax aware-
ness. It can therefore be argued that the federal government ought
to give states the option to solve the problem themselves by main-
taining the current tax rule of deductibility. After all, a rule of
nondeductibility would foreclose the optimal state law solution (of
tax awareness) by adopting the second-best solution to the under-
punishment problem. Put somewhat differently, the premise be-
hind nondeductibility proposals is that federal tax law should get
out of the way of state tort law. However, the proposals would
themselves actually get in the way of state tort law by preempting
the optimal correction to the very problem of under-punishment
that stimulated the proposals.
Second, as we have shown, under-punishment correction,
whether accomplished through tax awareness or nondeductibility,
inevitably comes with certain costs. For example, both proposals
would increase plaintiff windfalls and would create administrative
burdens. These costs should be weighed against the benefits asso-
ciated with correcting under-punishment. A federal tax rule of
nondeductibility would preclude the ability of states to perform
this cost-benefit analysis. But if punitive damages remained de-
ductible, states could undertake such an analysis in deciding
whether or not to implement a rule of tax awareness.120 States have
undertaken, and will continue to undertake, similar cost-benefit
analyses in designing and reforming their punitive damages re-
gimes.12' In addition, under a rule of nondeductibility, the adminis-
120 Consider, for example, the issue of whether punitive damages insurance coverage
should be allowed. As discussed above in note 63, some states have decided that the
under-punishment concern trumps the contractual expectations of the insured and
have disallowed this insurance. Other states have decided that contractual expecta-
tions trump the under-punishment problem and have allowed coverage. The different
approaches might be attributable to varying degrees of commitment to the goal of
imposing the appropriate penalty (though it could also be attributable to varying de-
grees of commitment to the freedom of contract or to satisfying the rational expecta-
tions of the insured). If so, states might likewise differ on the amount of cost that is
justified in correcting under-punishment.
121 Cf. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("The Court, I am convinced, unnecessarily and unwisely ventures into territory tradi-
tionally within the States' domain, and does so in the face of reform measures recently
adopted or currently under consideration in legislative arenas."). Justice Ginsburg's
federalism concerns cannot be dismissed simply as liberal politics; Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined her dissent.
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trative costs would be borne by the federal government, which
would be required to police the rule, while the benefit of under-
punishment correction would inure to the state (indirectly) and the
plaintiff (financially). Under a tax-awareness solution, this mis-
match of benefits and administrative burdens does not occur be-
cause the administrative costs of implementing a rule of tax aware-
ness are borne entirely by the state.
Finally, a state's "punitive" or extracompensatory damages re-
gime might not be punishment-driven.'22 For example, the regime
might be intended simply to compensate the plaintiff for intangible
injuries or to effect optimal cost internalization. In those cases, un-
der-punishment is not a concern, and the current rule of deductibil-
ity combined with juror tax blindness is generally adequate. If the
federal government retains the current rule of deductibility, states
can easily "opt out" of a rule of tax awareness where appropriate.
The nondeductibility solution, however, is probably not as flexible.
The IRS presumably would not rely exclusively on the state's label
for its extracompensatory damages regime and would instead
evaluate the underlying purposes of the regime in applying a non-
deductibility rule. The states stand in a far better position to evalu-
ate their own tort laws and apply a rule of tax awareness as they
see fit.m
In short, the state law solution of tax awareness is an appropri-
ately flexible solution to the under-punishment problem. It also
puts the costs of under-punishment correction squarely on the
m See, e.g., supra note 9; see also Guido Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts - The
Case of Punitive Damages, in Exploring Tort Law 333 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005)
(providing several non-punitive rationales for punitive damages); Sharkey, Revisiting
the Noninsurable Costs, supra note 63, at 446-47 (identifying the "compensatory pu-
nitive damages states" as "Connecticut, Michigan, and, on some accounts, New
Hampshire and Louisiana").
m For instance, consider Connecticut's approach in dealing with the issue of
whether punitive damages insurance coverage should be allowed. Common-law ex-
emplary damages in Connecticut "serve primarily to compensate the plaintiff for his
injuries and, thus, are properly limited to the plaintiffs litigation expenses less taxable
costs." Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 435 (Conn. 1992). On the one hand, because
punishment is not the goal, insurance coverage for common-law punitive damages has
been held not to violate public policy. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Shernow,
610 A.2d 1281, 1286 (Conn. 1992). On the other hand, statutory exemplary damages
in Connecticut have been found to be punitive in nature and, accordingly, they are
not insurable. See Tedesco v. Md. Cas. Co., 18 A.2d 357, 359 (Conn. 1941).
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state, whose interests are furthered by the correction. In contrast,
the frequently proposed federal solution of nondeductibility is far
more blunt an instrument and creates a mismatch between the
governmental entity that receives the benefit and the one that
bears the administrative costs.12 4
D. A Plaintiffs Windfall Profit Tax or Split-Recovery Schemes:
Possible Solutions?
We have thus far concluded that tax awareness is superior to
nondeductibility in correcting under-punishment. One foreseeable
but unintended byproduct of tax awareness, however, is that it
would increase the windfalls received by punitive damages plain-
tiffs under current law. As we have shown, increased plaintiff re-
coveries are, as a practical matter, a necessary consequence of cor-
recting under-punishment, regardless of whether tax awareness or
nondeductibility is chosen. One might consider imposing a "wind-
fall profits" tax on plaintiffs who receive punitive damages recover-
ies to ameliorate this unintended byproduct of tax awareness. Such
an excise tax on punitive damage recoveries would, in theory, re-
duce plaintiff windfalls. The same could be said for states employ-
ing split-recovery schemes.2
However, like a rule of nondeductibility, such an excise tax (or
split-recovery scheme) could be easily circumvented through set-
tlement in most cases. Circumvention could be accomplished
through settlements that disguise punitive damages as compensa-
tory damages, which would not be subject to the excise tax. Gains
' One might argue that a blanket national solution (nondeductibility) is preferable
over a piecemeal state solution (tax awareness) because it might take some states a
very long time to implement the solution and because some states might reject it
completely on non-normative grounds such as complexity. We are not persuaded by
this argument at this time. States ought to be given the space to implement the first-
best solution of tax awareness. If it turns out that a large number of states ultimately
fail to do so, at that point Congress could enact the second-best rule of nondeductibil-
ity. But if nondeductibility were implemented first and if it were easily circumvented,
states would then be unable to do anything more to correct under-punishment. Thus,
while the nondeductibility solution would effectively preempt the tax-awareness solu-
tion, there would be no similar preemptive effect if tax awareness were adopted by
some states and rejected by others.
m2 Split-recovery schemes require that a specified percentage of punitive damages
recovered by a plaintiff be paid over to the state. On split-recovery schemes, see gen-
erally Sharkey, Punitive Damages, supra note 35, at 372-89.
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from circumventing the excise tax could be shared with the defen-
dant because the defendant would have to agree to settle to
achieve the gains. Thus, while an excise tax would in fact reduce
the plaintiff's windfall, it would at the same time reduce the defen-
dant's punishment below that which a jury would have awarded.26
In other words, an excise tax would have similar effects to a rule
of nondeductibility. This is an example of the familiar tax maxim
that it does not matter which party to a transaction is the nominal
beneficiary of a tax benefit or the nominal victim of a tax burden
because the benefit or burden can be shifted through bargaining.127
Here part of the benefit from avoiding the excise tax would be
shifted through bargaining from the plaintiff (the nominal benefi-
ciary) to the defendant in the form of lower settlement costs. As a
result, an excise tax on plaintiffs, like a rule of nondeductibility, is
not advisable if one believes that a dollar of under-punishment cor-
rection is worth a dollar of windfall augmentation.
III. ADDRESSING OBJECTIONS
Recent proposals seek to solve the problem of under-
punishment by making punitive damages nondeductible. We have
shown that the better solution is to keep the current tax rule of de-
ductibility while making jurors tax aware. To be sure, this solution
causes plaintiffs' windfalls to be higher than they would be under
either a rule of nondeductibility or current practices. Nevertheless,
it is a practical impossibility under current punitive damages law to
achieve a reduction in under-punishment without such a tradeoff.
126 Tom Baker has previously recognized that split-recovery regimes create a strong
incentive to settle because "a punitive damages verdict would cost the defendant
more than the plaintiff would collect." See Baker, supra note 99, at 235. Because it
can be expected that this settlement surplus will be shared by the parties, under-
punishment will result. The same effect would result from a federal excise tax on pu-
nitive damages recoveries.
127 See Harvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Finance 302 (McGraw-Hill Irwin 9th
ed. 2010) ("The statutory incidence of a tax indicates who is legally responsible for the
tax.... Because prices may change in response to the tax, knowledge of statutory in-
cidence tells us essentially nothing about who really pays the tax.").
" As we have previously discussed, if one believes that a dollar of under-
punishment correction is not worth a dollar of windfall augmentation, then current
law-deductibility without tax awareness-should simply be left in place. See supra
Subsection II.B.2.
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Consequently, we believe that the recent proposals to make pu-
nitive damages nondeductible ought to be rejected. Instead, the
federal government should give states the option to solve the un-
der-punishment problem on their own through tax awareness. By
maintaining the current rule of deductibility, the federal govern-
ment would allow states to (i) perform a cost-benefit analysis to de-
termine whether correcting the under-punishment problem is
beneficial and (ii) implement the optimal correction to that prob-
lem.
In this Part we address potential objections to these conclusions.
While these objections are plausible, they ultimately do not per-
suade us that tax awareness is not the better solution to the under-
punishment problem.
A. Expressive Concerns
In recent decades, legal theorists have focused not only on the
direct effects of law, but also on the messages and values that laws
express and convey.129 In this vein, an "expressivist" might object to
our recommendation for preserving deductibility (albeit with tax
awareness) based on the concern that deductibility of punitive
damages would signal a permissive attitude by the federal govern-
ment towards reckless or malicious conduct. It would be better, on
this account, to adopt a nondeductibility rule which would signal
condemnation.'"
We believe, however, that any expressive benefit to be gained by
making punitive damages nondeductible is minimal. Punitive dam-
ages are currently deductible by business defendants, and yet it
seems clear that this treatment does not mitigate the public scorn
that punitive damages frequently trigger. Even with the current
rule of deductibility, punitive damages bring negative publicity for
business defendants and invite scrutiny of officers' actions by irate
shareholders, insurers, and creditors. Thus, there appears no need
'
29 See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson & Richard Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503 (2000).
"0 To support this view, expressivists might analogize punitive damages to govern-
ment fines, which are expressly nondeductible under the tax code. As we explain be-
low, the analogy to fines is imperfect.
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to change the tax rule to make the point that actions that trigger
punitive damages are condemnable.
In addition, it is doubtful that changing the tax treatment of pu-
nitive damages would be an expression that society realistically
would care about too deeply. The problem of under-punishment
stems from the fact that jurors, who are ordinary members of soci-
ety, are unaware of the fact and effect of deductibility under cur-
rent law. If punitive damages were nondeductible, we fully expect
that nearly all members of society would remain largely ignorant of
the tax treatment of punitive damages.
Finally, and most importantly, one of the ways we express our
values is by trying to shape the real-world effects of a legal prac-
tice."' In this context, our proposal is designed to better implement
the values associated with the jury's goal of meting out an appro-
priate level of punishment. As we said at the outset, we share
President Obama's concern that the goals of punitive damages are
being stymied by current practice. Our proposal is more effective
in addressing this problem because nondeductibility is, as a practi-
cal matter, so easily avoided. A concern for the expressive values
of a law should not require self-defeating policies.
B. Are Gross Ups Too Difficult for Juries to Calculate?
Some people may argue that lay jurors would be unable to calcu-
late tax gross ups on account of their complexity. Recall that, once
the defendant's marginal tax rate (t) is determined, the intended
penalty simply needs to be divided by (1 - t). We do not believe
this to be terribly difficult relative to the other mathematical tasks
that jurors regularly perform with the assistance of expert testi-
mony. 132
But if it were too difficult for juries, then judges could perform
the mathematical calculation, after the jury has determined the
marginal tax rate (unless the rate has been stipulated to by the par-
ties). In addition, courts could separate or bifurcate issues associ-
131 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev.
2021, 2045 (1996) (explaining why good expressivists should care about consequences
too .
1 Specific examples could also be provided such as: "if you wish to impose a pen-
alty of $100,000, and if you find the defendant's marginal tax rate is 40%, the proper
award is $167,000."
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ated with tax evidence from the core punitive damage issues de-
cided by the jury.'3 States might reasonably differ about who
should be making these calculations but to us, it is critical that
someone do it. Otherwise, the defendant's marginal tax rate is al-
ways effectively assumed to be zero, which would be erroneous in
many cases."
C. Should Evidence of Anticipated Collateral Consequences Be
Admitted?
If decisionmakers should be fully informed as to the tax conse-
quences of a punitive damages award, one might also wonder if
they should hear evidence that a defendant might seek to admit re-
garding the non-tax consequences of a punitive damages award.
For example, should a defendant be able to argue to a tax-aware
jury that it will have to pay additional amounts of money for en-
hanced insurance premiums or make advertising and public rela-
tions expenditures to mitigate damage from publicity of the puni-
tive award?
Presumably, if the jurisdiction wanted the jury to adopt a view
where juries were informed of the "whole suffering" of the defen-
dant,'35 the defendant could seek to admit this evidence in mitiga-
tion. The plaintiff would then counter with protestations that these
expenditures are speculative and that there is no guarantee that the
defendant will follow through on those potential expenditures."'
' Tax evidence could be presented only after the jury has determined that an award
of punitive damages is appropriate and calculated the amount of such award. At that
point, jurors would determine the defendant's marginal tax rate. Then the jury or the
judge would perform the mathematical calculation to arrive at the final punitive dam-
ages award.
See supra Subsection I.B.2 (noting that the effect of tax blindness is an assumed
defendant marginal tax rate of zero).
3 Cf., e.g., Adam Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 Colum. L.
Rev. 182 (2009).
6 One might respond to the uncertainty problem, however, by requiring that de-
fendants put such "collateral consequences" funds in escrow immediately after the
jury verdict. The problem with this response is that the size of those collateral conse-
quences funds are likely to be a function of the jury's verdict, in which case the defen-
dant (or its expert witnesses) would not be able to properly estimate the size of the
necessary "collateral consequences" fund until after the imposition of the punitive
damages award.
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By contrast, the jury can be certain of the government's imposition
of taxes and the defendant's obligation to pay them. Courts might
simply and reasonably head this path off by noting that such miti-
gation evidence is outside the province of the jury's function. Spe-
cifically, in the realm of punitive damages, the jury is acting as the
public's deputy in imposing a punitive damages award, and the af-
ter-tax effects of such an award are relevant to shaping the decision
of how much that award should be. By contrast, how private par-
ties contingently decide to respond to the imposition of that award
is normatively outside the responsibility of the public's considera-
tion, and that of its deputy (here, the jury or court).m
D. Analogizing Punitive Damages to Government Fines
Some might object to our proposal by pointing to the tax law's
treatment of government fines. Under Section 162(e) of the Code,
these fines are expressly nondeductible. By analogy, one could ar-
gue, punitive damages should likewise be nondeductible." There
are two critical distinctions, however, between government fines
and punitive damages. First, government fines are often imposed
without regard to the individual attributes, such as financial condi-
tion, of the wrongdoer; instead these fines are typically "sched-
uled." By contrast, punitive damages are usually determined by the
jury in a highly individualized manner, with great sensitivity to the
Another related concern about anticipated consequences relates to the possibility
of a defendant manipulating its current marginal tax rate to reduce the amount of a
grossed-up award. For example, a defendant could accelerate deductions or losses.
Such a possibility, while in theory a concern, should not be a significant problem.
Taxpayers already have an incentive to lower their current marginal tax rate at the
expense of increasing future marginal tax rates due to the time value of money. Thus,
taxpayers ordinarily lower their current marginal tax rate to the maximum extent fea-
sible, even absent punitive damages considerations.
m See Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of
Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming June 2010). As sug-
gested in the text by reference to the contingent nature of these collateral conse-
quences, there is also a forseeability problem, which raises normative and practical
questions: for example, what if, because of the punitive damages award, the defendant
revises its policies and ends up making more profit? There is a limit on how much the
jury and the law can do to anticipate the future; our proposal, by contrast, recognizes
the authority of the familiar proverb that taxes, like death, are reasonably certain.
" This argument assumes that the current nondeductible tax treatment of govern-
ment fines is normatively appropriate. We assume arguendo that it is, but there might
be situations where it is not.
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financial condition of the defendant. Thus, while punitive damages
could relatively easily be grossed up to account for tax effects, civil
fine regimes often lack the ability to do so.
Second, in tort cases, the payee of punitive damages, the plain-
tiff, is also entitled to compensatory damages. This duality allows
for easy circumvention of a rule of nondeductibility because puni-
tive damages can be readily disguised as compensatory damages. In
the context of civil fines, the payee, the government, is not typically
entitled to any other type of payment. Thus, the nondeductibility
of fines cannot ordinary be circumvented by disguising the fines as
another type of (deductible) payment.
Because of these two distinctions, disparate tax treatment of civil
fines and punitive damages is justified. It would ordinarily be diffi-
cult to gross up civil fines without changing the process by which
they are imposed, and there is typically no risk of circumvention in
the civil fine context.
E. The Impact of Insurance
Finally, it might be argued that insurers could adequately moni-
tor pre-trial settlements to ensure that they are characterized accu-
rately for tax purposes." As previously mentioned, some states
"' In addition, even if there were a risk of circumvention (because, for example, part
or all of the payment to the government could plausibly be characterized as restitu-
tion or remediation), the federal government could protect itself in cases where the
civil sanction was imposed by a federal statute and where there is some variability in
the amount of the sanction. It could do this by considering tax effects in determining
the amount of the payment it seeks from the taxpayer. See, e.g., Letter from Chuck
Grassley, Senator, to Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman (Aug. 15, 2008) (on file with
author), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel-dataPage
ID_1502=16331 (encouraging the SEC to consider grossing up sanctions in order to
offset the benefit of tax deductibility). Alternatively, the federal government could
require, as a condition of settlement, that the taxpayer (defendant) agree not to claim
the sanction as a deduction. Accordingly, in the case of federal civil sanctions, there is
no circumvention issue because there are only two parties involved: the federal gov-
ernment (as the "fine" collector and tax collector) and the taxpayer. In the case of
punitive damages or state or local civil sanctions, there are three parties involved: the
plaintiff or state/local government (as fine collector), the federal government (as tax
collector), and the taxpayer (defendant).
' See Mark Geistfeld, Tax Breaks for Bad Behavior? On the Relation Between In-




disallow punitive damages insurance coverage on public policy
grounds.14' Even in states that allow this coverage, some policies
might explicitly exclude coverage for punitive damages, though
such an exclusion is apparently rare. 42 In these cases, insurance
companies would not be legally responsible to pay the punitive
damages portion of any settlement. Accordingly, insurance compa-
nies should in theory resist paying any more than the compensa-
tory value of the plaintiff's claim. If so, under a nondeductibility
regime, the IRS could free-ride on the insurance company's moni-
toring efforts.'43
Before considering whether insurance companies are in fact ef-
fective monitors, it should be noted that the free-riding argument
applies only in cases involving an insurance company that has an
incentive to monitor. Some defendants, particularly in high-risk
businesses, are self-insured." Others buy insurance coverage from
related, captive insurance companies, who would have little if any
incentive to monitor because they are part of a single economic
unit that includes the defendant. In other cases, the compensatory
portion of the plaintiff's damages might equal or exceed the limits
of the insurance policy. If so, then the defendant's contributions to
the settlement could plausibly be characterized as additional com-
pensatory damages. Finally, a common clause in insurance con-
tracts excludes coverage for "intentional or expected" harms; to
the extent the exclusion applies, the defendant will in effect be self-
insured.'45 In all of these situations, either there is no insurance
141 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
1 See Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L.
Rev. 101, 122 (1998).
14 In other words, if insurance companies were good monitors, the IRS could be
confident that only amounts paid by the otherwise-insured defendant were punitive in
nature.
'" See, e.g., Guy Chazan, BP's Escalating Costs Put Investors on Edge, Wall St. J.
(May 1, 2010), http://online.wsjcom/article/SB1000142405274870409320457521634170
7748822.html (noting that BP is self-insured).
145 See Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs, supra note 63, at 434 ("Insur-
ance policies typically contain exclusions for 'expected' or 'intended' acts."). How-
ever, as Tom Baker has explained, because of the practical blurriness of the line be-
tween intentional versus unintentional conduct and strategic behavior by plaintiff and
defense counsel, insurance companies often have difficulty enforcing this exclusion.
See Baker, supra note 99, at 223-25 (explaining the "underlitigation strategy" em-
ployed by plaintiff and defense counsel in order to ensure coverage of acts that might
be excluded by the intended or expected exclusion).
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company monitoring the settlement or it has little incentive to do
so. As a result, the IRS will not be able to take advantage of the in-
surance company's monitoring in reviewing the defendant's settle-
ment allocation. Likewise, the monitoring argument has no force
where punitive damages are fully covered by insurance because, in
those cases, the insurance company does not care whether amounts
are characterized as compensatory or punitive in nature as it is re-
sponsible to cover both types.
Thus, the monitoring argument is relevant only in the remaining
cases, where, under the law and the facts, an insurance company
will be liable only for compensatory damages and the unrelated in-
sured defendant only for punitive damages. In those cases, the is-
sue is whether insurance companies in practice refuse to pay the
punitive portions of pre-trial settlements. Based on numerous in-
terviews with prominent personal injury lawyers, Tom Baker has
found that insurance companies routinely pay the punitive compo-
nents of settlements even when they are not legally obligated to do
so. In other words, insurance companies rarely refuse to settle a
case based on the ground that the settlement includes a premium
Mark Geistfeld has suggested that the tax code should be amended to disallow de-
ductions for all damages, whether compensatory or punitive, stemming from "ex-
pected or intended" harms, and that the IRS could free-ride off of the insurance com-
pany's efforts in policing the line between intentional/expected (non-covered)
conduct and unintentionallunexpected (covered) conduct. See Geistfeld, supra note
140.
But there are several problems with this approach. First, as explained above, Baker
has shown that insurance companies are themselves unable to effectively police this
line. Second, even if insurers could police effectively, the specific contractual language
in the majority of insurance policies might differ from the language in the tax code
denying the deduction for damages. Even if the language were similar now, insurance
policies might evolve to allow for the taxpayer argument that conduct excluded from
coverage by the policy is nevertheless eligible for a deduction under the tax statute
that Geistfeld envisions. Third, in close cases the insurance company might settle by
agreeing to cover part of the settlement. Such an outcome would not provide much
guidance to the IRS as to whether the conduct was intentional or not. Finally, a tax
law standard based on the intentional/expected standard would apply to all defen-
dants, including those that are actually or effectively self-insured or those whose in-
surance policy uses a different standard for exclusion. In those cases, the IRS would
have no ability to free-ride and would be required to police the intentional/expected
versus reckless/negligent line on its own. This task would be extremely difficult to do,
as insurers can attest. Cf. Nw. Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir.
1962) (Gewin, J., concurring) ("The borderline between willful and wanton injury and
injury as the result of simple negligence, is often a hairline distinction.").
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reflecting the prospect of a punitive damages recovery if the case
were to go to trial. In part, this is because of the difficulty in valu-
ing the compensatory versus punitive portions of the plaintiff's
claim.'" Baker also suggests that this is because insurers are wary
of a bad-faith lawsuit should they reject what turns out (with the
benefit of hindsight) to have been a favorable, within-limits settle-
ment offer.47 Baker explains how plaintiff and defense counsel
(and sometimes judges) use this wariness to pressure insurance
companies to settle aggravated fault cases at a premium. Conse-
quently, "insurance companies in effect provide insurance for puni-
tive damages even in states ... that formally prohibit such insur-
ance."'" It therefore seems unlikely that the IRS would be able to
free-ride on the monitoring efforts of insurance companies even in
those limited situations where it theoretically could.
CONCLUSION
Current legal practices result in the significant under-
punishment of business defendants because punitive damages ju-
rors do not take into account the fact that these defendants are al-
lowed to deduct their punitive damages awards. To solve this prob-
lem, the Obama administration recently proposed making all
punitive damages nondeductible, a proposal that has in the past
been supported by a number of policymakers and academics.
Proponents of blanket nondeductibility, however, have ne-
glected to consider three critical, interconnected facts. First, under-
punishment could readily be solved by states simply by making ju-
rors (or judges) aware of the tax consequences of punitive damages
payments. Thus, federal intervention in state punitive damages law
is not absolutely necessary and it is potentially counterproductive.
Second, current punitive damages law seems to allow plaintiffs'
lawyers to make jurors tax aware; if it does, the under-punishment
problem could be resolved without passing state legislation. Third,
a rule of nondeductibility would be very difficult for the IRS to en-
'" See Baker, supra note 99, at 228 (noting that insurers are aware that plaintiffs'
lawyers can quite readily transform punitive damages into additional compensatory
damages in aggravated fault cases).
See id. at 228-34.
'n Id. at 235.
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force effectively because litigants could, through settlement, read-
ily disguise punitive damages as compensatory damages.
By overlooking these facts, proponents of a nondeductibility rule
have failed to analyze correctly the under-punishment problem and
its potential solutions. Properly evaluated, the under-punishment
problem can, at least in theory, be corrected either by making ju-
rors tax aware or by making all punitive damages nondeductible.
Ultimately, however, the choice between these mutually exclusive
solutions depends on how easily a rule of nondeductibility could be
circumvented through settlements. If a rule of nondeductibility is
easily circumvented, as we are confident it would be, a rule of tax
awareness is always the better solution to the under-punishment
problem. This is primarily because, when a rule of nondeductibility
is circumvented through settlement, defendants would participate
in the gains from circumvention in the form of lower after-tax set-
tlement costs, resulting in precisely the same under-punishment
problem that nondeductibility is intended to correct. There is no
similar risk of circumvention under the alternative solution of tax
awareness, however. For that reason, we think the tax-awareness
solution advanced herein is preferable to both current practice and
the reform proposed by the Obama administration.149
"' We leave for another day consideration of how tax and torts rules could better be
reformed to mitigate the ineluctable tradeoff we identified under current law between
the enrichment of plaintiffs and the under-punishment of business defendants. See
Dan Markel, Overcoming Tradeoffs in the Taxation of Punitive Damages, 88 Wash.
U. L.R. (forthcoming 2011).
